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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
A CLOSER LOOK AT FIRM–GROUP “CLOSENESS”
This study offers a more formal examination of firm–group closeness than offered
previously in the literature. Studies usually implicitly assume a vague and arbitrary def-
inition that close firms are firms which share similar characteristics. This study specifies
those “similar” characteristics that “close” firms share. Accordingly, the contributions
of this study are six–fold. First, a more explicit definition of firm–group closeness in
an accounting information sense is given and a discussion of the challenges in forming
a universal definition is made. Second, two new measures of firm–group closeness are
rigorously developed, simulated and discussed. Through simulation I show that both
measures capture firm–group closeness as conceptualized in the paper since groups of
firms one would expect ex ante to not be as close rank lower on the closeness measures
than those firms one would expect ex ante to be closer. Third, I evaluate the two most
widely used industrial classification schemes (SIC & GIC) in regards to their ability
to group “comparable” firms. I find that both schemes group firms into industries ex-
hibiting smaller accounting closeness than most users realize. Fourth, I devise a trading
strategy using information provided by the two measures which generates statistically
significantly positive abnormal returns. Fifth, I contribute to the contagion literature,
most notably Gleason et al. 2008, by showing that a contagion effect does not just exist
as a result of negative news but also persists in the presence of positive news. Finally, I
find evidence that contagion effects don’t exist in all industries. Specifically, I find that
the magnitude of the industry–specific contagion effect is a function of the closeness of
that particular industry. That is, when an industry exhibits reasonably high closeness
a contagion effect is present but when an industry exhibits closeness not statistically
different from zero, no contagion effect is observed.
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Chapter 1: “Closeness” Defined and Measured
1.1 Introduction
Determining which groups of firms are similar and which ones aren’t has interested
researchers for a long time. Industrial classification schemes have been devised to help
partition firms into groups that are similar on some dimension (usually primary revenue
generating business activity, or market perception). Researchers then have examined the
degree to which these schemes group similar firms. The benefits of developing ways to
group similar firms seem to fall into two categories. The first category I would classify
as methodological and the second theoretical.
From a methodological point of view, researchers often are looking for an effect of
variable X on variable Y across companies holding other (often unobservable) variables
constant. One way to do this is to group firms who are similar (hypothetically on many
of these unobservable characteristics) so that the researcher can add a group similarity
variable as a control in order that the explanatory power of X on Y is not confounded
with the explanatory power of other variables across these firms on Y. Current industrial
classification systems seek to group similar firms and researchers take advantage of these
grouping schemes to control for any potential group–similar variables that may also have
an affect on Y. The implicit assumption of course being that the firms in a given industry
are similar in regards to these unobservable characteristics.
From a quasi–theoretical point of view, with fundamental analysis, analysts and
investors seek to predict fundamental accounting measures of performance (i.e. earnings
and cash flows) and it is helpful to have similar firms to look to as guidance in predicting
other firms’ variables. From a pure theoretical point of view, it would seem interesting
to me that we define what it means for a group of firms to be similar (i.e. which
dimensions and from which users’ perspective we care about) and then develop a method
to determine, if given a group of firms, the extent of similarity that exists within that
group. Current industrial classification schemes seek to do this to some extent but the
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classifications mostly ignore fundamentals. For example, two firms could have the same
revenue–generating business activity and therefore be included in the same GICS or SIC
industry but, because of firm–level characteristics, have vastly different fundamental
earnings processes (i.e. one firm outsources its’ business but the other doesn’t) and
hence uncorrelated fundamentals over time. I am not aware of a study to–date which
has examined the degree to which industrial classification schemes group firms whose
fundamentals move together over time.
Another dimension used to group firms is market perception. A few studies have
evaluated the industrial classification schemes in regards to their ability to group firms
whose share prices move similarly. I would argue that this also potentially could group
firms which do not have correlated underlying fundamentals. For this to be true one must
relax the assumption that share price is exactly equal to the sum of discounted expected
future earnings. In fact, a firm’s share price is not only a function of fundamentals but
also of market noise or bias1. Consider the following example. Suppose we have two
firms, A and B which have the same revenue generating business activity. Firm A is an
industry leader (i.e. Apple) while firm B is a follower. Suppose firm B has a good year
greatly exceeding analysts’ forecasts while firm A has a mediocre year but announces that
they will come out with a highly anticipated product in two years (i.e. Apple announcing
the launch of the iphone). Suppose the market increases its’ price for firm A similarly
to firm B (percentage–wise). The reason the market does this for firm B is because
fundamentals were higher than expected. The reason the market does this for firm A
is because the firm has been touted as an historically high performer and the market
won’t let one bad year affect its’ favorable bias towards firm A. The market revises future
expected earnings upward although current earnings just meets expectations due to the
expected future potential related to the new product. The market may care more about
the “coolness” of the new product than the underlying fundamentals of the firm and
price the firm accordingly. Thus in this year underlying fundamentals are uncorrelated
(B’s high earnings are not associated with mediocre earnings for A) but share prices
1Lee 2001 provides an intuitive argument for why this is true.
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move similarly for firms A and B.
The firm is the economic entity about which accountants, investors, analysts, and
the rest of the market cares. In other fields the unit or entity of interest varies but
the relationships among these units have been exhaustively studied . For example, in
Psychology the unit of study is the individual and ample research regarding the degree of
similarity among individuals has been conducted. Similar scores on psychometric tests
and personality classification schemes (i.e. Myers–Briggs and the Five Factor personality
test) have been devised in order to group personality–similar individuals.
In Genetics the unit of study is the gene and extensive research has been done regard-
ing genetic distance (see for example, Nei (1972), Nei (1978), Reynolds et al. (1983)) .
Genetic distance is a measure of genetic similarity and can be a function of many factors.
In its’ simplest form genetic distance between two populations is the differences in the
frequencies of a trait. That is, if 80% of the U.S. population is right handed while 85% of
the Chinese population is right–handed then the genetic distance between the U.S. and
China with respect to the trait of right–handedness is 5%. A weighted average of the
genetic distance of several individual traits could then be computed and be a measure
of overall genetic similarity.
Furthermore, in Mathematics the units of study are numbers and a major branch
of study —Number Theory — within mathematics is concerned with the relationship
among these units. For example, many different metrics have been devised to measure
the degree of similarity (distance) between two points in space. The Euclidean distance
metric is the most intuitive measure of distance between two points and is what one
would obtain if they measured the distance between the points with a ruler. Other
measures of distance have been devised however such as the Minkowski or “taxicab”
metric, the Chebyshev metric and the Mahalanobis distance.
Finally, in Computer Science, and more specifically the subfield of Computer Foren-
sics, “datum” (or pieces of data) are the unit of consideration. While computers are
great at identifying identical datum, they often perform poorly when required to identify
similar datum. Accordingly, research has been conducted to help computers recognize
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and report that strings of datum are similar even when these strings are not identical.
Specifically, cryptographic hash functions have been devised which transform a string
of datum into a fixed-size bit string. Given hash function H and two strings of datum
(A & B) which are not identical, if H(A) == H(B)∗, then A and B are similar to each
other with a high–degree of certainty (∗) (Paar et al. 2010).
In Accounting however, there does not exist much research regarding the similarity of
firms. This is a deficiency being that the conceptual framework, put forth by the FASB,
identifies “comparability” as one of the four enhancing characteristics of accounting
information2. Industrial classification schemes have been devised by non–academics with
the exception of the Fama–French classification. Even their classification however starts
with the SIC classification and further refines it based on firms’ differential exposure
to risk (i.e. high cap vs. low cap and high book/market vs. low book/market firms).
Only a handful of studies have examined how well the current industrial classification
schemes classify similar firms. Most of these studies examine the degree to which the
classifications can predict share prices. The underlying assumption being that if share
prices move similarly so too must the underlying fundamentals.
To my knowledge only one recent study (De Franco et al. [2011]) has attempted to
define what it means for two or more firms to be close in an accounting information sense.
The reason for this logically seems to be due to a couple of factors. First, the set of
accounting information is not well-defined. That is, some people would consider element
x (i.e. MD&A disclosures) to be in the set of accounting information while others would
consider it a part of another set of information. Second, even if one assumes that the set
is well-defined universally then there are many elements in this set and these elements
are available to many different users at different times. For example, suppose we all agree
on what constitutes the set of accounting information for any firm. That is, suppose we
agree that the set of accounting information is defined as I = {c, d, e}. Next, suppose we
have two firms A and B, each with this set of accounting information. Further, suppose
that information source c is available to management only (e.g. a budget) before the
2A discussion of this is provided later when I define “closeness”.
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firm engages in its business for the period while information sources d and e are output
information sources available to all interested users ex post (e.g. income statement and
statement of cash flows). In this example the question of whether firms A and B are
close in an accounting information sense is a tough one since I haven’t specified which
elements in the set of accounting information that closeness should be judged in light of
and which users’ perspective should be considered (i.e. internal or external information
users). For example, suppose I decide that closeness is based on the degree of similarity
of element c between firms. Also, suppose firms A and B have very similar elements
d and e (i.e. very similar income statements and statements of cash flows) but vastly
different elements c (i.e. different budgets). The dissimilarity in element c between firms
A and B is not known by external investors since they do not observe the budget for
either firm. Therefore, given the elements they can observe (d and e), they would classify
the two firms as more similar than a manager — who can observe all three elements —
would.
From this simple example one should see that there cannot be one overall definition
of closeness. Any proposed definition must first begin with the assumption that the set
of accounting information is well–defined and then must specify on which elements in
this set closeness is based and which users’ perspective is being considered.
In addition, a major challenge in defining closeness for a group of firms in an account-
ing information sense is the specification of the time frame considered. That is, firms
could have similar accounting information sources available to them before engaging in
their business for the period (e.g., similar budgets) but have uncorrelated outputs ex
post (e.g., uncorrelated earnings or cash flows) due to uncorrelated transactions. Or
alternatively, firms could have correlated earnings and cash flows with other firms over
some time periods but not over others.
Prior studies usually implicitly assume a vague and arbitrary definition that close
firms are firms which share similar characteristics. Stock returns have been the char-
acteristic that studies tend to focus on. Specifically, stock return comovement (e.g.,
Lee et al. 2003, Chan et al. 2007) has been proposed as one measure of firm–group
5
closeness. Prior research has analyzed stock return comovement under the different in-
dustry classification schemes to see if the classification schemes group stocks which are
reasonably close. The prior studies also assess the relative explanatory power of each
scheme regarding covariation in returns. In an economic information sense, stock return
comovement does seem to be a reasonable measure of closeness. However, I would argue
that stock return comovement may be a rather poor operationalization of closeness in an
accounting information sense as returns are not only a function of accounting variables
but also of investors expectations and “biases”.
A more formal discussion is provided in this study than what has been offered pre-
viously regarding firm “closeness” which offers insight into the theory of the firm as an
economic entity and how it relates to other economic entities (firms). Furthermore, in
light of this discussion, current industrial classification schemes can be evaluated quali-
tatively as to how they group firms and quantitatively with the two measures developed
in this study. Finally, a trading strategy can be developed which utilizes information
contained in the measures to generate returns higher than expected.
The first measure of closeness introduced in this study measures the correlation in
abnormal3 earnings and abnormal cash flows4 among a group of firms over time. Cor-
relation in earnings and other ex post accounting variables was examined in Ball and
Brown (1967) and stock return comovements have also been examined in prior literature
but abnormal earnings or abnormal cash flow correlation has never been measured in the
literature. One benefit of using abnormal earnings and cash flows over stock returns to
capture accounting closeness is that these variables are more a function of fundamentals
than are stock returns. Stock prices are functions of investor response to supply and de-
mand in the marketplace. The supply and demand for shares is, of course, a function of
the underlying accounting fundamentals but also is a function of investor noise and/or
bias. Prices (and thus returns) can change sometimes when the expected underlying
3Abnormal simply implies actual less expected with expected earnings and cash flows derived from a
simple random walk model as discussed later.
4Since the measures in this study only include “profitability” variables, one could also include variables
from other dimensions describing the firm. For example, variables from the liquidity, activity and
leverage dimensions of the firm could be included thereby forming a multidimensional measure.
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fundamentals do not (see Lee et al. 2001 for an intuitive argument for why this is true).
Unexpected earnings however cannot change unless either actual earnings change and/or
expected earnings change.
The second measure of closeness is the average determinant of the abnormal earnings
and abnormal cash flow correlation matrices between each pair of firms in a group of
firms. The determinant is a mathematical measure of the volume of a figure represented
by the row vectors of a square matrix. The closer the determinant is to zero, the closer
the rows are correlated with each other and thus the smaller the angle between each
of the row vectors. A zero determinant implies perfect correlation between each of the
rows and thus each of the row vectors lie on top of each other giving zero–volume. The
determinant is thus an intuitive measure of closeness of the row vectors5.
When developing a measure for closeness it is essential to ensure that the mea-
sure adequately captures the desired construct. Specifically, in this study, the Feltham,
Ohlson (1996) earnings model is simulated. I simulate the model for 10 groups of 100
firms. Model parameters, shock distributions and mean and variance of shocks are
equal within–groups6 while parameters and shock variances vary across groups. This
should ensure within–group correlation in abnormal earnings and cash flows ex post and
between–group differences in correlation of abnormal earnings and cash flows. Thus, the
closeness measures can be judged against this backdrop. Differences between groups in
the closeness measures should be observed since each group has a different threshhold
of randomness in its’ earnings process (i.e., different second moment for each groups’
shock distribution). Specifically, a trend of decreasing within–group closeness should
be observed as variances of shocks increase since the firms within each group are the
same ex ante in every other respect and the less deterministic the model is made (i.e.,
increasing the variance of the shocks), the lower the within–group closeness should be.
The contributions of this study are six–fold. The first (Chapter 1) is a more explicit
definition of firm closeness from a more fundamental accounting information perspective
5See Appendix B
6Within–group, the firms’ accounting functions are identical.
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and a discussion of the challenges in forming a universal definition. The second (Chapter
1) is a rigorous development, discussion and simulation of two new measures of firm–
group closeness. Through simulation, I ensure that the measures adequately capture
the “closeness” construct as defined in the paper. Third (Chapter 2), I evaluate the
two most widely used industrial classification schemes (SIC & GIC) in regards to their
ability to group “comparable” firms. I find that both schemes group firms into industries
exhibiting smaller accounting closeness than most users realize. Fourth (Chapter 3), I
devise a simple trading strategy using information provided by the two measures which
generates statistically significantly positive abnormal returns. Thus, there is value–
relevant information contained in the measures that the market (at least historically)
does not seem to fully appreciate. Fifth (Chapter 3), I contribute to the contagion
literature, most notably Gleason et al. 2008, by showing that a contagion effect does not
just exist as a result of negative news but also persists in the presence of positive news.
Finally (Chapter 3), I find evidence that contagion effects don’t exist in all industries.
This suggests that the magnitude of the industry–specific contagion effect is a function of
the closeness of that particular industry. That is, when an industry exhibits reasonably
high closeness a contagion effect is present but when an industry exhibits closeness not
statistically different from zero, no contagion effect is observed.
1.2 Related Research
A recent study by De Franco et. al. (2011) is the first towards grasping the concept
of “closeness” in an accounting information sense. This study was refreshing to read as
it provides a clever way to analyze a fundamental concept of accounting information. In
their study they first define the accounting system of a firm as a mapping from economic
events to financial statements. The mapping they have in mind takes the form below. . .
FinancialStatementsi = fi(EconomicEvents) (1)
That is, the information summarized in firm i’s financial statements is a function of the
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economic events which give rise to that information. Next they let firm specific returns
proxy for the effect of economic events on the firm and earnings proxy for financial
statement information and they assume the following fi. . .
Earningsit = αi + βiReturnsit + εit (2)
They thus assume that α̂i and β̂i proxy for the accounting function f(·) for firm i.
Similarly the accounting function for firm j is proxied by α̂j and β̂j. They reason that
the “closeness” of the functions fi and fj represents the comparability between firms
i and j. To proxy for this comparability they first estimate earnings for firms i and j
using firm i’s function. That is, they estimate the following regression. . .
E(Earnings)iit = α̂i + β̂iReturnit (3)
E(Earnings)ijt = α̂j + β̂jReturnit (4)
where E(Earnings)iit is the estimated earnings for firm i using firm i’s function and firm
i’s return in period t and E(Earnings)ijt is the estimated earnings for firm j using firm
j’s function and firm i’s return in period t. Thus they are holding the economic events
constant and asking the question of how close the expected fundamental accounting
performance summary measure is for both firms ceteris paribus. Closeness of these
expected fundamentals implies closeness of the accounting functions fi and fj since the
economic events (i.e. returns) are held constant. They measure these expectations for
each of the previous 16 quarters leading up to each time period and take the average
of the sum of the absolute value differences between expectations in each of these 16
quarters. This gives them a measure of comparability between firm i and firm j using
the economic events of firm i.
There are several points I would like to make regarding the above study. First, there
seem to be some construct validity issues with the equation (2) operationalization of the
equation (1) theoretical setup. Returns can capture some economic events but not all
of them. Those events that are held in confidence by the firm would flow through to
the financial statements in period t but would not affect returns until those statement
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were released to the market. Thus, in some sense, returns are a function of the financial
statement information rather than the converse. Along the same theme, returns capture
things other than economic events. Returns are also a function of investor bias however
we would not surmise that any part of the financial statements is a function of this bias.
In summary, I am arguing that the equation (2) estimate of the accounting system in
equation (1) is somewhat noisy. While equation (1) is an attractive and intuitive theo-
retical setup of the accounting system, its’ simplicity undermines attempts to estimate
it. For example, what is an economic event? Is it simply a transaction that the firm
records with a journal entry or is it anything that affects the firm even if no accounting
entry is made? What exactly is the function that is to be modeled? Is the function
double–entry accounting? Is it more than just the journal entries. Without answers to
these questions, approximations of equation (1) will be somewhat noisy. With this being
said however, the equation (2) ,(3) and (4) approximations are a clever way to model
equation (1) and a good first step towards understanding closeness between firms.
Second, knowing that prices lead earnings in time, they assume that similar mapping
functions from returns to earnings for two firms indicates the two are comparable. I would
argue however that returns are a function of fundamentals and investor bias. Lee (2001)
provides an intuitive argument for why this is true. Share prices (and therefore returns)
are a result of buying and selling in the marketplace with supply/demand economics
fueling the equilibrium prices that obtain. Demand for and the supply of shares is
a function of fundamentals and investor bias. Thus I would argue, as before, that two
firms (i and j) could have correlated returns but have uncorrelated (or weakly correlated)
underlying fundamentals7. In this situation, as long as the mapping functions were
similar (fi(·) ' fj(·)), De Franco et. al. (2011) would imply that the two firms are
comparable or “close” whereas it seems that fundamentally they are not8.
Third, it is possible that two firms could have been exposed to identical economic
events, accounted for them with different mapping functions and still have identical
7See Chan et al. 2007 for example who find that mean GIC 2–digit industry pair–wise correlation in
stock returns is 0.39 while mean pair–wise correlation in sales is only 0.19.
8See the example given earlier (page 3) for this situation.
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financial statements. I discuss this possibility in more detail in the next section.
Finally, De Franco et. al. (2011) do allow for the possibility that fundamental
accounting information (i.e. earnings) could fulfill a comparability role to investors even
when the accounting functions per se are different (i.e. possibly because the economic
events each firm is exposed to are different). They agree that information regarding the
covariance of earnings between two firms could be helpful in forecasting earnings of one
of the firms. An advantage of this idea is one does not have to specify and estimate the
accounting system. They provide an alternative measure of comparability which takes
advantage of this. Specifically, they estimate the following regression. . .
Earningsit = Φ0ij + Φ1ijEarningsjt + εijt (5)
They estimate this regression for all possible pairs of firms (i, j) in each two–digit SIC
industry and the 16 previous quarters of data. They then calculate the adjusted R2 9
10 and this is their measure of closeness. It is important to note that this measure only
captures the strength of correlation rather than the sign since it is bounded below by
zero and above by one. Therefore the measure cannot distinguish those firms whose
earnings are positively correlated from those whose earnings are negatively correlated.
Knowing that two firms have negatively correlated earnings is just as beneficial as know-
ing that they have positively correlated earnings since both forms of knowledge yield
equal predictive power. Also, their main measure uses estimated earnings where this
alternative measure uses actual earnings. For those firms whose returns do a poor job of
predicting earnings their main measure could conceivably classify a pair of firms as close
when in fact their actual earnings are uncorrelated or vice versa. It would be helpful to
know the degree to which this “alternative” measure and their main measure coincide
with each other. Specifically, it would be interesting to know for a given firm–pair (i, j)
in a two–digit SIC industry how often the two measures both agree that the two firms
are comparable (or “close”). In order to do this sort of analysis one must first define
9The adjusted R2 is the same as the normal R2 in this case since there is only one explanatory variable.
10The R2 of a regression with only one explanatory variable is equivalent to the square of the Pearson
Product Moment correlation between the two variables.
11
the threshold at which each measure would rank two firms as comparable versus non–
comparable. It is interesting to note that their main measure is statistically significantly
associated with analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion while this measure is not. How-
ever why does this result hold? Is it because the alternative measure fails to adequately
capture “closeness” or does this result depend on how “closeness” is defined?
Prior to the most recent study regarding this topic discussed above, a few studies have
offered measures of closeness and tested these measures for firms grouped according to
the major classification schemes (SIC, GICSSM, NAICS and FF)11. These classification
schemes usually group firms based on primary revenue generating business activity with
diversified firms usually put in separate industry groups or industries. Industrial classi-
fication schemes are rather important in archival financial research. Weiner (2005) finds
that on average 30% of papers published in the top three finance and top two accounting
journals use industrial classification systems. He finds that the main purposes for using
them are sample restriction (34%), comparable company selection (31%), and detection
of industry effects (12%). Thus there is a demand for a measure of economic related-
ness among firms in financial research and current industrial classification systems have
been developed to meet this demand. Several studies have examined how each of these
systems capture “economic relatedness” among firms. A few of these studies further ex-
amine the degree of homogeneity among firms in regards to accounting variables (sales,
earnings etc.) as a result of being grouped according to these classification systems.
An important early study by Ball and Brown (1967) estimates the degree of associ-
ation between the earnings of a firm and the average earnings of the other firms in the
same industry and in the economy. They don’t define closeness however as the degree of
association in earnings, rather they assume that industry classifications group together
firms which are similar in significant ways (earnings association being one of these ways).
They find that 35 − 40% of the variances in firm’s annual earnings are associated with
the market (earnings averaged over all firms) and 10 − 15% can be explained by the
11Standard Industrial Classification, Global Industry Classification System, North American Industrial
Classification System and Fama & French’s (1997) classification
12
variance in the industry (earnings averaged over firms grouped by two–digit Standard
and Poor’s industry classification). This is consistent with King (1966) who finds sim-
ilar results with returns the variable of interest instead of earnings. Furthermore, they
find that correlations between firm earnings and average industry earnings over time
are mostly positively significantly greater than zero and thus they conclude that firms
are reasonably well classified by industry. Throughout their analysis they reason that
any operational definition of an industry is arbitrary. Theoretically, they agree that an
industry is a group of firms who share similar characteristics. However, operationalizing
this conceptual definition depends on which characteristics one wants to ensure are sim-
ilar for a group of firms. They offer one potential redefining of an “industry” in terms
of the covariability of earnings of firms but they do not elaborate and leave the idea
for potential future research. This is exactly the idea that this study hopes to exploit,
although unintentionally. A definition along these lines would capture closeness in an
accounting information sense since most would agree that earnings are a key element in
the set of accounting information.
Ball and Brown (1967) also discuss an alternative definition of an industry put forth
in the finance literature by Miller and Modigliani (1958). There, an industry has been
defined as the set of all firms whose individual ex ante probability distribution of returns
differ at most by a scale factor and whose ex ante returns for every anticipated state of
the world are perfectly positively correlated with those of every other firm in the same
set. They point out however that this confirms the idea that an operational definition of
an industry may be entirely arbitrary since the ex ante distributions of returns of firms
are not generally observable. Also, the definition is in an economic information sense in
that the market – along with accounting information – helps to determine share prices.
One could argue that any sort of economic definition of an industry is not in one–to–one
correspondence with an accounting definition since there is not a one–to–one mapping
between elements in the set of accounting information (e.g. earnings) and those in the
set of economic information (e.g. returns). Finally, they argue that studies should be
concerned with ex post distributions and that an industry might be better defined in
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terms of the proximity of association between the ex post earnings of various firms.
A 1989 study by Clarke seeks to answer the question of whether industries based
on SIC codes are able to separate firms into homogeneous economic groups. Using
Compustat North America and a sample period of 1975 − 1983, he uses a regression
approach and concludes that profit ratios, sales changes and stock price changes of
companies cannot be well explained by the SIC industry structure.
Another more recent study by Bhojraj and Lee (2001) uses a valuation approach to
group firms. They argue that the choice of comparable firms should be a function of the
variables that drive cross–sectional variation in a given valuation multiple. They develop
a “warranted multiple” for each firm based on annual cross–sectional regressions of two
fundamental accounting ratios (price to book and price to sales) on variables which drive
cross–sectional variation in these ratios (e.g. profitability, growth and proxies for risk
characteristics). They then use the estimated coefficients to predict future ratios for
each firm. These future predictions are each firms’ “warranted multiples”. They find
that when regressing the two ratios on the explanatory variables for firms grouped by
industry the R2 is around 14%. When grouping by size the R2 marginally increases
to 15% and when grouping by warranted multiples the R2 triples for the current year
and more than doubles for the other years (they are running regressions predicting
current, one–year ahead and two–year ahead EV\S and P\B ratios). They conclude
that using “warranted multiples” as a procedure for identifying comparable firms offers
sharp improvements over choosing comparable firms by industry or size.
An additional study by Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) compares industry classification
schemes on their ability to explain comovements in stock returns as well as cross–sectional
variations in valuation multiples, research and development expenditures, key financial
ratios and forecasted and realized growth rates. They find that the GICS is superior to
the NAICS, SIC and FF classifications at accomplishing this goal. Again, they do not
attempt to define closeness in an accounting information sense, rather they offer that
one measure of economic relatedness of firms is the extent to which their stock returns
are contemporaneously correlated. I would argue that groups of firms could rank high
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on this measure but low in regards to correlation in their earnings. In theory when
expected earnings equal realized earnings the two measures would agree with each other
since price is a function of investors, expectations. However the degree to which the
measures diverge should be increasing with the magnitude and sign of the correlation in
unexpected earnings. For example consider two firms A and B which have high positive
correlation in returns over a period of time. Also assume that firm A has low positive
abnormal earnings (relative to the mean) each period over the time frame considered
while firm B has high positive abnormal earnings (thus abnormal earnings for the two
firms are negatively correlated). Also suppose that the earnings expectation function for
both firms is identical. One explanation for this scenario is if firms A and B have low
correlation in earnings over the time frame such that firm A experiences earnings just
beating expectations each period while firm B experiences earnings greatly exceeding
expectations each period.
Finally, Chan, Lakonishok and Swaminathan (2007) also find that both the GICS
and FF do a relatively good job at grouping companies based on return co–movement.
Specifically, they find that stocks belonging to the same industry share a higher correla-
tion in returns than those belonging to different industries. Furthermore, this difference
in correlation is increasing with the size of the companies considered and the fineness
of the partition. They find for example, with a sample of large–cap stocks, correlations
in returns between industry members differ from correlations in returns between non–
member companies by, on average, 0.13 at the two–digit level, 0.14 at the four–digit
level, 0.17 at the six digit level, and 0.18 at the eight digit level. They also find that
companies in an industry, on average, share much weaker comovements in sales growth
rates than in their returns. This is consistent with the idea that high correlation in
returns does not necessarily imply high correlation in earnings.
Ball and Brown (1967) highlight the challenges with developing a non–arbitrary defi-
nition of an “industry”. In short, they speak to the idea of defining closeness for a group
of firms. Later, researchers arbitrarily analyze measures of closeness empirically without
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first attempting to define closeness or offering much reasoning12 for why they choose the
measure they do. Thus a gap in the literature exists in which a theoretically defended
definition and measure of closeness would fill. Also, prior literature offers one statisti-
cal measure of closeness; simple correlation in the characteristics of interest. A second
mathematically intuitive measure of closeness would help with construct validity. If two
measures of the same construct converge, one can be more confident that each measure
captures the desired construct. Related to this is the idea that all prior studies assume
that a correlation measure will accurately capture closeness. A simulation can help to
bolster confidence in this assumption. In a simulation, the researcher can ensure that
two firms have highly correlated earnings processes ex ante which under certain assump-
tions would lead to high correlation in earnings ex post. Thus high closeness measures
calculated for the two firms ex post would help to ease concerns that the measures fail
to adequately capture closeness. This study employs such a procedure.
1.3 A Definition of Closeness
A definition is proposed based on the idea that firms engage in economic transactions
. These transactions are then accounted for by the firm during its’ accounting cycle
and, upon completion of the reporting process, the financial statements are produced.
In theory, the function that maps the transactions to the financial statements should
be the firm–specific application of the pervading accounting principles/standards (i.e.
GAAP in the U.S.). These applications are of course expressed in the form of journal
entries. However, since any organized system of accounting principles/standards allows
subjective discretion at times, each firm will have its’ own specific mapping. Thus,
analogous to De Franco et al. 2011, I am qualitatively describing the following idea . . .
(Financial Statements)i = fi(Economic Transactions) (6)
The financial statements I am referring to are the statements themselves absent
the footnotes. The economic transactions are defined as economic events that the firm
12With the exception of De Franco et. al. 2011.
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captures with a journal entry. Now the financial statements alone are functions of more
than just economic transactions. For example, accruing bad debts expense does not
directly follow as a result of an economic transaction but is accounted for and thus
embedded in the financial statements. Since I only consider the financial statements
themselves, the function fi in equation (6) is the double–entry accounting system (i.e.
the journal entries) which is a linear mapping of the transactions to the financials. Of
course this setup is overly simplistic since fi itself is a function of firm i’s particular
interpretation of GAAP. However, I abstract away from these conceptual difficulties
with the goal being a definition of closeness free from construct validity issues in regards
to the equation (6) theoretical setup.
Now I propose that, for a given set of economic transactions, two firms could have
vastly different mappings (i.e. different fi’s) but produce similar financial statements. If
we abstract away from an accounting context, equation (6) is of the form y = f(x) and
there are many functions which can map a given x to a given y. For example, consider
three functions defined as follows and graphed in the x–y plane on the following page.
fi(x) = sin(x) +
3
2
fj(x) =
1√
2
cos
(
x− π
4
)
+
3
2
fk(x) =

−2
π
√
2
x for x ∈
[
(4n−3)π
4
, (4n+1)π
4
]
n odd
2
π
√
2
x for x ∈
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(4n−3)π
4
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4
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n even
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Figure 1.1: Different Functions Mapping Same Inputs to the Same Output
One realizes that fi 6' fj 6' fk13 when in fact there is an infinite set of points X1 =
{x1, x2, x3, . . .} such that fi(xi) = fj(xi) = fk(xi) = y1 and another infinite set of points
X2 = {b1, b2, b3, . . .} such that fi(bi) = fj(bi) = fk(bi) = y2. These points occur at the
intersection of the functions and are shaded dark in Figure 1.1.
In this sense it seems that firms i, j & k are comparable or close since we have infinitely
many cases where the economic transactions are the same, the functions are different but
the financial statements are identical and also infinitely many points where the economic
transactions are different, the functions are different but the financial statements are still
identical.
Viewing equation (6) in an accounting context, it is known14 that, given a set of finan-
cial statements and a set of transactions, there can be different sets of non–negative jour-
nal entries that can generate those financial statements. The journal entries are the func-
13That is, graphing how they each respond to changes in their inputs (i.e. their derivatives) shows that
sometimes fi is increasing whenever fj and fk are decreasing etc. Also, their ranges are different and
fk is linear whereas fi and fj are curvilinear.
14For example, see Fellingham et. al. (CAR 2000). They show that, given a linear representation of
the accounting system Ay = x and a quadratic loss function for the reader, a vector representation
of the set of journal entries which produces the financial statements given and minimizes the readers’
loss exists and is in fact the sum of the null space and row space component of A. Incidentally this
solution is the readers’ Bayesian posterior mean and best guess. Furthermore, this solution is not
necessarily unique.
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tion that maps the transactions to the financial statements and for a given firm i we thus
know that there are many possible fi’s which could generate (Financial Statements)i
holding the economic transactions constant. Therefore two firms could have different
mappings (i.e. fi 6' fj) over time simply due to different interpretations/applications of
GAAP but have similar financial statements. In this scenario it would seem that from a
fundamental ex post accounting information sense the two firms are similar even though
each firm processed the same set of economic transactions differently.
So it appears that we have a tradeoff when attempting to define closeness. If we
define closeness as the closeness in functions then we have to address the possibility
that two firms could have different functions but identical financial statements. From
an investors’ or analysts’ standpoint, should these firms be viewed as similar or not?
Also, the similarity in functions (and thus financial statements) will be driven by the
fact that each firm is constrained by GAAP. I would argue that the vast majority of
journal entries made by firms are identical due to application of the objective parts of
GAAP. It is only in those areas where GAAP allows subjective interpretation or multiple
methods that the journal entries would differ between a pair of firms. Observing that
a pair of firms has similar functions (i.e. similar set of journal entries) doesn’t tell
us how much of that similarity is due to both firms being subject to the same set of
objective accounting principles and standards versus how much is due to those firms
processing/interpreting those subjective parts of these standards in a similar way.
The benefit however of defining closeness as the similarity in functions allows us to
explicitly control for the economic transactions. Defining similarity as the closeness in
financial statements however and observing that two firms are close does not tell us how
much of this closeness is due to both firms being exposed to similar economic transactions
versus how much of this closeness is unrelated to the closeness of the underlying economic
transactions.
Also, it should be pointed out that if two firms have dissimilar financial statements,
it is possible for them to have similar functions given the same economic transactions.
That is, the same issue illustrated in Figure 1 can arise if closeness is defined as simi-
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larity in financial statements. For example suppose fi(x) = x + 3 and fj(x) = x + 15.
The functions are similar (i.e. same shape with same slope) but each takes economic
transactions of x = 5 to dissimilar financials (i.e. fi(5) = 8 6' fj(5) = 20).
The financial statements however give an overall picture of the financial health of
a company and provide key indicators which help market participants judge the future
performance of the company. Since I will define closeness considering that investors are
the users, I would argue that they would care less about knowing whether the under-
lying functions for two companies are similar given two vastly different sets of financial
statements than they would about knowing whether the financial statements were simi-
lar given the companies processed the same set of economic transactions differently (i.e.
different functions). That is, investors care more about similarity in financial statements
when comparing two companies than in similarity in the way each company processed
the economic transactions they were exposed to. Since most investors realize that all
firms face the same set of accounting principles and standards15, it seems reasonable to
assume that these investors care more about ex post financial statement similarity than
whether firms interpret the standards similarly.
It should be pointed out at this point how the previous discussion relates to the
FASBs’ conceptual framework definition of comparability.
“Comparability is the quality of information that enables users to identify
similarities and differences between two sets of economic phenomena. Con-
sistency refers to the use of the same accounting policies and procedures,
either from period to period within an entity or in a single period across
entities. Comparability is the goal; consistency is a means to an end that
helps in achieving that goal.” (¶111–122, emphasis mine)
The above definition of comparability does not map directly into equation (6). I interpret
the definition given to mean that two companies are comparable if the quality of the ex
post information contained in each of their sets of financial statements is high enough
to enable a user to identify the similarities and differences in the ex ante economic
transactions each company was exposed to. This is much different than saying that two
15Some industries (e.g. Oil & Gas) have specific standards applicable only to them. However, for the
most part, the principles and standards that govern firms’ reporting are common to all firms.
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firms are comparable if their financial statements themselves are similar. In fact, the
above definition leaves open the possibility that firms i and j could have “non–similar”
financials but be comparable firms as long as the quality of the information contained
in their respective sets of financial statements is high enough. Comparability defined
in such a way though is rather vague and non–intuitive. The word “comparability”
implies similarity and vice versa, not the quality of information that helps one determine
similarity. Therefore, to comprehend the definition, one has to divorce themselves from
the notion that comparability implies similarity or that similarity implies comparability.
That is, two firms could be subject to vastly different sets of economic transactions but
still be comparable (according to the definition) so long as the quality of the information
contained in their respective sets of financial statements is high enough to enable ex post
users to identify these ex ante differences.
Based on the preceding discussion I will define “closeness” as the degree of simi-
larity in the outputs of the accounting system rather than the degree of similarity
in what I will loosely refer to as the “structure” of the accounting system (i.e. the degree
of similarity between fi and fj). The outputs of the accounting system should reflect
the underlying transactions from which they are derived and thus if two firms have fun-
damental outputs which move predictably (i.e. positively or negatively correlated), then
I view those firms as “close” or similar whether or not they process their respective
transactions similarly.
In defining closeness as the degree of similarity in ex post accounting information I
am implicitly allowing this “similarity” to proxy for the “quality” that the conceptual
framework definition refers to. I interpret the FASB definition as implying that compara-
bility is viewed as similarity in ex post financial statements (I call this “closeness”) while
consistency (which is a necessary means to comparability) is similarity in accounting
functions across periods within an entity or across entities within a single period.
21
1.4 Measuring Closeness
Given the conceptual definition above, a second–level conceptualization is proposed. I
assume the users (i.e. those interested in determining closeness) are potential investors. I
also assume that the financial statements of a firm do a good job of faithfully representing
the underlying transactions from which they are derived16. There are many pieces of
accounting information displayed in the financial statements and related disclosures of
a firm. The degree of correlation between the level of each of the pieces of financial
statement information across firms and time is how closeness will be operationalized17.
That is, given a group of N firms, one can say that the higher the correlation between
each of these firms’ financial statement information levels (i.e. earnings and cash flow
dollar values) across time, the closer is the group of firms. Notice the definition is ex post
in the sense that I don’t consider accounting information available for firms before they
engage in their specific business activity; I only look at the between–firm relatedness
of the level of the financial accounting information after the firms have completed their
periodic financial reporting process. Therefore, two firms could be close ex ante in the
sense that they have the same principal business activity (and thus be classified in the
same industry) and same potential consumer base etc. but not be close ex post due to
the by–products of their accounting information systems being uncorrelated.
1.4.1 Measure One
As conceptualized, closeness is hard to measure since each piece of information in
the financial statements and related disclosures should be considered. Incorporating
the information in disclosures into an overall measure of firm closeness is difficult so I
will focus on just the information in the basic financial statements18. Still, incorporat-
16Li (2010) provides evidence that this assumption should be tempered by the readability and tone of
the annual report. Decreased readability and increased negativeness in the tone of the annual report
(from a textual analysis perspective) may indicate that key financial statement summary measures of
performance do not faithfully represent the underlying transactions from which they are derived.
17Thus I am not capturing other dimensions of “similarity” in the conceptual definition such as similarity
in information quality (i.e. earnings quality) for example.
18i.e. income statement, balance sheet, statement of cash flows.
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ing each piece of financial statement information into an overall closeness measure is
cumbersome unless a key assumption is made. Assume that the summary performance
measures (e.g. earnings and cash flows) of a firm do a good job of capturing all of the
information available in the financial statements and thus all available information in the
underlying transactions. Then looking at the correlation between these measures across
time, between firms will capture closeness as defined above. After all, earnings and cash
flows are both functions of the other information contained in the financial statements.
More specifically, we know that both earnings and cash flows capture changes in assets,
liabilities and equity across periods. In this sense, the assumption that earnings and
cash flows capture all available information in the financial statements is warranted19.
However, rather than develop a measure based on realized earnings and cash flows,
it seems more appropriate to consider unexpected earnings and cash flows. Ohlson,
(1995) demonstrates that assuming linear information dynamics, the value of the firm
is a linear function of the firms’ abnormal earnings, book value and “other” information
available to market participants. In theory, if market participants know that earnings
and cash flows will always be as expected then the price they are willing to pay for the
firm will remain constant. It is only when market participants revise their estimates of
future expected earnings and cash flows based on unexpected earnings and cash flows
that their valuation changes. Abnormal earnings and abnormal cash flows capture not
only realized earnings and cash flows but also the expectations of investors and thus
a measure of closeness based on unexpected earnings and unexpected cash flows seems
appropriate. Recall, closeness was defined with investors assumed as the users of the
accounting information. With this being said, the same argument made earlier regarding
why correlation in returns may not capture closeness of the underlying fundamentals
applies here. Abnormal earnings and cash flows for two firms could be correlated over
time with underlying earnings and cash flows for these same firms being uncorrelated due
19In reality however, there are often items on the balance sheet that do not flow through the income
statement (i.e. dirty surplus items) and thus closeness in these items across firms through time would
not be captured by a measure that was simply a function of earnings and cash flows. A balance sheet
summary item such as book value of equity could be added to both measures introduced in this study
to address this concern.
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to the former capturing “noise” and investor bias20. However, since potential investors
are considered as the information users rather than a theoretically–minded hypothetical
person(s) which cares only about similarity in the underlying fundamental outputs of
the accounting information system, unexpected earnings and cash flows take precedence.
From an individual investors’ standpoint, abnormal earnings and cash flows capture
not only what is going on at the firm level but also capture other investors thoughts
and beliefs. With that being said, the measures introduced in this study can easily
incorporate actual earnings, cash flows, R&D and any other fundamental output of the
accounting system as well as any linear combination of these outputs.
Given the definition of closeness proposed and the preceding discussion regarding
precedence of the abnormal earnings and cash flow summary performance measures, the
first measure introduced is rather straightforward. Suppose there is a group of N firms
for which summary performance measure data is available for p periods. Let one measure
of closeness be defined as the weighted average of the average correlation in abnormal
earnings and abnormal cash flows21 for firm i with each of the other N − 1 firms in the
group with an equal weight of 1
2
given to both variables. More specifically let rij be the
sample Pearson Product Moment Correlation between firm i and j’s abnormal earnings
over p periods with i = {1, 2, . . . , N} and j = {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N}. Then the
following statistic measures the closeness of the N firms.
C1AE(r) =
1(
N
2
) N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
rij (7)
where
rij =
T∑
p=1
(AEip − AEip)(AEjp − AEjp)√√√√ T∑
p=1
(AEip − AEip)2
√√√√ T∑
p=1
(AEjp − AEjp)2
(8)
20The same example given earlier applies here.
21Actual earnings & cash flows as well as the difference between actual earnings & cash flows and
abnormal earnings & cash flows (i.e. “true” earnings & cash flows) were also used in the measures.
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with AEip representing abnormal earnings for firm i in period p and AE is the mean.
Also,
(
N
2
)
= N !
2!(N−2)! is the number of ways to choose a pair of items from N items.
Analogously let C1ACF measure closeness of the N firms with respect to their abnormal
cash flows as defined above with ACF substituted for AE. Then the first measure
of closeness is C1 = 1
2
(C1AE + C
1
ACF )
22. Note that since the sample Pearson Product
Moment correlation r is bounded between negative and positive one, so is C1AE. High
positive values of C1AE indicate that on average relatively (relative to each firm’s mean)
high abnormal earnings for firm i are associated with relatively high abnormal earnings
for the other N − 1 firms in the group. In contrast, high negative values of C1AE indicate
that on average relatively high abnormal earnings for firm i are associated with relatively
low abnormal earnings for the other N − 1 firms in the group. Another way to think of
C1AE is that high absolute values of C
1
AE imply closer firms in the sense that the ability
to predict the other N − 1 firm’s abnormal earnings from knowing firm i’s abnormal
earnings is increasing in C1AE. In contrast, low absolute values of C
1
AE for a group of
firms implies that knowledge of any one of the firm’s abnormal earnings gives little to
no information aiding in the prediction of the other N − 1 firm’s abnormal earnings.
Furthermore, Pearson’s correlation is a measure of linear correlation between vari-
ables. That is, it is a quantification of how well the association is represented by a
straight line. Two variables may be highly related to one another with r = 0 simply
because a non–linear relationship exists. For example if both high and low abnormal
earnings for firm i are paired with low abnormal earnings for firm j but medium abnor-
mal earnings for firm i are paired with high abnormal earnings for firm j then there is
a curvilinear association between the abnormal earnings of firm i and j. A U-shaped
figure would describe this association rather than a straight line.
The interpretation of the correlation coefficient in (7) is subjective. Several authors
have offered guidelines for the interpretation of a correlation coefficient. Cohen (1988)
however points out that all such criteria are arbitrary and should not be observed too
22Intuitively, the first measure is the average of all pair–wise abnormal earnings correlations among a
group of firms.
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strictly. He argues that the interpretation of a correlation coefficient depends on the
context. For example, a correlation of 0.9 may be very low if one is verifying a physical
law using precise instruments but may be regarded as very high in the social sciences
where many other complicating factors are present. Fortunately there are statistical
tests developed to test the significance of correlation23. These tests don’t have to be used
however since the measures are means of correlations. With a large sample (N > 30) a
regular Z-test can be used since, according to the Centra Limit Theorem, the sampling
distribution of C1 and C2 (introduced later) will be approximately normal.
Example 1
An example is in order to illustrate the application of the first measure. Suppose,
without loss of generality, I have the following abnormal earnings and cash flow matrices
. . .
AE =

17 3 4 10
2 19 1 12
5 23 3 13
8 7 6 18

ACF =

9 3 4 7
5 14 10 6
13 8 9 2
1 7 15 11

which represent abnormal earnings and cash flows for four firms (columns) over four
periods (rows). Now calculate the matrix P of correlations where entry rij corresponds
to the correlation in abnormal earnings between firm i and j over the four periods and is
calculated using (8). That is I find the Pearson Product Moment Correlations between
each pair of columns of the abnormal earnings matrix . . .
23See Fishers (1915) test. Also, a standard t–test can be applied since the sampling distribution of the
Pearson Product Moment Correlation coefficient approximately follows a Student’s t distribution with
N − 2 degrees of freedom and test statistic t = r/
√
(1− r2)/(N − 2).
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P =

r11 r12 r13 r14
r21 r22 r23 r24
r31 r32 r33 r34
r41 r42 r43 r44

=

1 −0.8427 0.5189 −0.3174
−0.8427 1 −0.6727 −0.0617
0.5189 −0.6727 1 0.6352
−0.3174 −0.0617 0.6352 1

Each row of P is the correlation of firm i’s abnormal earnings with itself and the other
firms in the group. Now calculate C1AE by taking the average of the upper triangular
part of P according to (1) as follows . . .
C1AE =
1(
4
2
) 3∑
i=1
4∑
j=i+1
rij
=
1
6
(−0.8427 + 0.5189− 0.3174− 0.6727− 0.0617 + 0.6352)
≈ −0.1234
Next, I calculate C1ACF using the same procedure as above and get C
1
ACF = −0.1890.
Finally, I find C1 as the equally–weighted average of C1AE and C
1
ACF . . .
C1 =
1
2
C1AE +
1
2
C1ACF
=
1
2
(−0.1234− 0.1890) = −0.1562
Comparing the z-stat to the critical value in this example gives . . .
z-stat = −0.5594 > −1.645
The null hypothesis that there is not a statistically significant association between the
four firm’s abnormal earnings and cash flows (i.e. H0: C
1 = 0) is not rejected at the 5%
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level since the z-score is not less than the critical value24.
1.4.2 Measure Two
The determinant of a matrix is a measure of the closeness of the individual column
vectors of the matrix. More specifically, the determinant of a square matrix represents the
volume of the figure that the columns of the matrix form25. The closer the determinant is
to zero the smaller the volume and thus the more correlated the column vectors. When
the determinant is zero the column vectors are superimposed on each other and thus
perfectly correlated. This property of the determinant implies that I can form a matrix
whose columns are abnormal earnings for firm i and whose rows are the number of time
periods considered. The determinant of this matrix is an overall measure of closeness of
the individual columns which represent different firm’s abnormal earnings26.
The determinant of this matrix however is unbounded and therefore hard to interpret.
Therefore, a better idea is to form a variance–covariance matrix of abnormal earnings
between a pair of firms and calculate the determinant for this matrix. The determinant of
a variance–covariance matrix for a pair of random variables is known as the generalized
variance and is a measure of the overall co–variability of the two variables. Another
way to describe it is the determinant of the variance–covariance matrix measures the
overall information in the matrix which is the combined variance of the variables less
any correlation/co–variance in the variables. Thus the closer the determinant is to zero,
the more the variables co–vary and are correlated with each other. Similarly, taking
the determinant of a correlation matrix gives a measure of closeness of the variables.
The correlation matrix is simply a standardized variance–covariance matrix where each
(i, j) entry is standardized by the product of variable i and j’s standard deviation. The
determinant of the correlation matrix enjoys the added benefit of being bounded below
by zero and above by one, thereby making interpretation and comparison to closeness
24Note that it is hard to reject the null if the sample size is small—as it is in this example.
25See Appendix C for a proof of the two by two correlation matrix case.
26See Appendix B for a visual depiction of measure two.
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measure one much easier.
Specifically, suppose I have a group of N firms and suppose abnormal earnings for
each firm is a random variable with a specified mean and variance. Next, suppose I first
calculate the correlation matrix for each pair of firms in the group. . .
CORRAE(i, j) =
rii rij
rji rjj
 =
 1 rij
rji 1
 (10)
with rij the Pearson Product Moment Correlation between abnormal earnings for firm i
and j over a specific time period.
Next, suppose I form a matrix whose (i, j)’th entry is the determinant of the correla-
tion matrix of abnormal earnings for firms i and j as follows (the vertical bars represent
the determinant). . .
DETAE =

|CORRAE(1, 1)| |CORRAE(1, 2)| · · · |CORRAE(1, N)|
|CORRAE(2, 1)| |CORRAE(2, 2)| · · · |CORRAE(2, N)|
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
|CORRAE(N, 1)| |CORRAE(N, 2)| · · · |CORRAE(N,N)|

(11)
Next, take the average of the upper triangular part of DETAE. This gives the average
determinant of each of the abnormal earnings correlation matrices for each distinct pair
of firms in the group. This is the second measure of overall firm group closeness in
regards to abnormal earnings. . .
C2AE =
1(
N
2
) N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
|CORRAE(i, j)| (12)
Repeating the above procedure with abnormal cash flows gives C2ACF and thus the second
overall measure of firm group closeness is C2 = 1
2
(C2AE + C
2
ACF ).
In general, a couple of things to note about the determinant are the following. First,
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if the columns of the matrix are linearly dependent — that is one or more of the columns
in the matrix can be obtained by a linear combination of the other columns — then the
determinant will always be zero. This implies that if two firms in a group of N firms have
abnormal earnings which are perfectly positively correlated then the determinant of the
matrix of abnormal earnings for these two firms will always be zero. More specifically,
if I examine the determinant of CORRAE(i, j)
27 I see that it is bounded below by zero
and above by one.
det(CORRAE(i, j)) = |CORRAE(i, j)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 rij
rji 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 0 ≤ 1− r2ij ≤ 1 since 0 ≤ r2ij ≤ 1
The only way for the determinant of CORRAE(i, j) to equal zero is if the abnormal
earnings for the two firms are perfectly correlated (rij = 1). Therefore all of the entries in
DETAE are constrained between zero and one immediately implying that 0 ≤ C2AE ≤ 1
since C2AE is the average of all the upper triangular entries in DETAE. Thus, values
close to one for C2AE indicate low group closeness while values close to zero indicate high
group closeness. This is in contrast to C1AE where values close to one indicate high group
closeness while values close to zero indicate low group closeness.
Second, determinants have ordinal, interval and ratio properties. To illustrate order
suppose I calculate C2AE = 0.8 for a group of firms and C
2
AE = 0.4 for another distinct
group of firms. I can say that the abnormal earnings of the first group of firms co–vary
less with each other than those of the second group. That is, the second group of firms
with C2AE = 0.4 are closer as defined earlier than the first group of firms with C
2
AE = 0.8.
To illustrate the interval property assume the same example as above. I can also say
that the abnormal earnings of the second group of firms co–vary twice as much with each
other than those of the first group. Thus the second group of firms are twice as close as
the first group.
27The following discussion applies to C2ACF as well.
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Example 2
An example illustrating C2 will be informative. Assume the same information in
Example 1. That is, suppose I have the following matrix of abnormal earnings over four
periods (rows) for a group of four firms (columns). . .
AE =

17 3 4 10
2 19 1 12
5 23 3 13
8 7 6 18

ACF =

9 3 4 7
5 14 10 6
13 8 9 2
1 7 15 11

First, I calculate CORRAE(i, j) for each pair of firms to form DETAE and keep only the
upper triangular part as follows. . .
DETAE =

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 −0.8427
−0.8427 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0.5189
0.5189 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 −0.3174
−0.3174 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 −0.6727
−0.6727 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 −0.0617
−0.0617 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0.6352
0.6352 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− − −

=

0 .2899 .7307 .8993
− 0 .5475 .9962
− − 0 .5965
− − − 0

I have filled in the lower triangular part with“−” since it is the same as the upper
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triangular part. Also the omitted diagonal contains zeros since |CORRAE(i, i)| = 0 for
all i. Finally, calculating the average of the upper triangular portion of DETAE gives
C2AE . . .
C2AE =
1(
4
2
) 3∑
i=1
4∑
j=i+1
|CORRAE(i, j)|
=
1
6
(0.2899 + 0.7307 + 0.8993 + 0.5475 + 0.9962 + 0.5965)
≈ 0.6767
Next, I repeat the above procedure and find C2ACF = 0.7028. Thus the second overall
measure of firm group closeness in this example is . . .
C2 =
1
2
(C2AE + C
2
ACF )
=
1
2
(0.6767 + 0.7028) = 0.6897
Now applying a standard Z-test as in Example 1 gives . . .
z-stat = −2.3204 < −1.645
Thus, the null hypothesis that there is a not a statistically significant association between
the four firm’s abnormal earnings and cash flows (i.e. H0: C
2 = 1) is rejected at the 5%
level since the z-stat is less than the critical value. Thus we see that C1 and C2 do not
yield consistent results in this example.
The example was constructed to be an extreme example. That is, one in which C1 is
negative while C2 is positive and the sample size is extremely small. With larger sample
sizes and C1 agreeing in sign with C2 the measures usually interpret consistently with
each other. This will be demonstrated later in the simulation section and with real data.
1.4.3 Interpreting the Measures
While it is useful to have these tests, it is likely that empirically there will be some
association between a group of firm’s abnormal earnings. I wish to not only say that
this association is statistically significant but also be able to interpret the magnitude.
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Unfortunately with the determinant measure (C2), there is no guidance on interpreting
the magnitude. I will therefore employ the same interpretation scale that has been
proposed for the correlation measure and only modify it for the determinant measure
based on some insight obtained through the simulations that are discussed in section
1.7. Also, notice that C1 is between negative and positive one while C2 is between zero
and one. Thus C1 can tell us something about negative correlation while C2 cannot. C2
only measures the degree of correlation not the direction while C1 measures both. The
following table gives a possible interpretation of C1 and C2 which will be followed in the
next section when interpreting the two measures for simulated abnormal earnings and
cash flows28.
Table 1.1: Interpreting C1 and C2
Firm-Group Association −1 ≤ C1 ≤ 0 0 ≤ C1 ≤ 1 0 ≤ C2 ≤ 1
High [-1, -0.5) (0.5, 1.0] [0, 0.35)
Med [-0.5, -0.3) [0.3, 0.5) [0.35, 0.6)
Low [-0.3, -0.1) [0.1, 0.3) [0.60, 0.85)
None [-0.1, 0] [0, 0.1) [0.85, 1.0]
Note that in Example 1 C1 = −0.1511 and in Example 2 applying C2 to the same
matrix of abnormal earnings gives C2 = 0.6897. From Table 1.1 one sees that C1 classifies
the group as having small association since −0.3 ≤ −0.1511 ≤ −0.1. Also, C2 classifies
the group as having small association since 0.6 ≤ 0.6897 ≤ 0.85. Additionally, the first
measure tells us the small association is negative while the second measure does not give
us information regarding the direction of association. We could therefore infer from this
evidence that the group of firms from Examples 1 & 2 has small negative association.
28The reason for the bigger range on the C2 interpretation intervals above is due to the fact that C2
is more sensitive to the randomness in a firms earnings process than C1 as demonstrated in the
simulations.
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1.5 Theoretical Discussion of the Measures
1.5.1 Properties of the Measures
It turns out that the closeness measures C1 and C2 are not measures in a formal
mathematical sense. Before understanding why, I will provide some background intro-
duction to mathematical measure theory. First, a measure in mathematics is defined over
a “set”. A set is simply a collection of elements. For example, the set X = {a, b, c, d} is
a collection of the four elements a, b, c and d. The set that must exist before a measure
can be defined over it is called a σ–algebra. Before defining a σ–algebra I will define a
power set since it will be used in the definition of a σ–algebra. A power set P is the set
of all subsets29 of a set X. Now let X be some non–empty set and let P be the power
set of X. Then a subset Σ ⊂ P is called a σ–algebra if it satisfies the following three
properties . . .
(1) Σ is non–empty: There is at least one A ⊂ X in Σ.
(2) Σ is closed under complementation: If A is in Σ, then so is its complement, X\A.
(3) Σ is closed under countable unions: If A1, A2, A3, . . . are in Σ then so is A =
A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 ∪ . . ..
From these properties it also follows that X itself and the empty set ∅ are also in Σ. To
see this note that by (1) since Σ is non–empty, you can pick some A ⊂ X that is in Σ, and
by (2) you know that X\A is also in Σ. Thus by (3) we know that A∪ (X\A) = X ⊂ Σ.
Finally, if X ⊂ Σ then by (2) we know that the complement of X or the empty set is in
Σ.
An example now will suffice to illustrate a σ–algebra. Suppose I have the set described
above X = {a, b, c, d}. One possible σ–algebra on X is Σ = {∅, {a, b}, {c, d},
{a, b, c, d}}. One can see that Σ is non–empty. Also one can see that Σ is closed under
complementation since the complement of each set in Σ is also in Σ. Finally, Σ is closed
29A subset is a collection of elements from a set.
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under unions since the union of any of the subsets of Σ is also in Σ.
Now that I have introduced the concept of a σ–algebra I will discuss what a measure
is. Let Σ be a σ–algebra over a set X. A function µ from Σ to the extended real
number line (i.e. including positive infinity) is called a measure if it satisfies the following
properties . . .
(i) Non–negativity: µ(E) ≥ 0 for all E ⊂ Σ.
(ii) Countable additivity: For all countable collections {Ei}i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets
in Σ: µ
(⋃
i∈I
Ei
)
=
∑
i∈I
µ(Ei).
(iii) Null Empty Set: µ(∅) = 0.
If we letX be the set of all U.S. current publicly traded firms and Σ be the power set of
X. We can quickly see that Σ is a σ–algebra as it is non–empty and closed under comple-
mentation and unions. However, we can also just as quickly see that neither C1 nor C2 are
measures in a formal mathematical sense as both violate property (ii) above. That is the
closeness of a particular set of firms is not necessarily equal to the sum of the closeness of
a particular combination of pairwise disjoint subsets of that set. Using Example 1 again
let Σ = {∅, 1, 2, 3, 4, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4},
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} with E1 = ∅, E2 = 1, E3 = 2, . . ., E16 = {1, 2, 3, 4}. We saw that
C1
(⋃
i∈I
Ei
)
= −0.1562 but a calculation gives
∑
i∈I
C1(Ei) = −1.7183. Thus C1 does
not display countable additivity. A similar calculation shows that C2 is not countably
additive either. Also, C1 violates property (i) above since −1 ≤ C1 ≤ 1 however C2 is
non–negative as shown earlier.
In summary, neither C1 nor C2 are formal mathematical measures. C1 violates
properties (i) and (ii) that mathematical measures must possess (i.e. non–negativity and
countable additivity) while C2 violates property (ii). So I have shown that neither of the
closeness measures introduced in this study are formal mathematical measures. Rather,
C1 and C2 intend (and do) capture closeness and in this sense they are considered
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measures30. It turns out that C1 and C2 would satisfy the properties above and be
considered formal mathematical measures if the formula for each was altered. For C1 to
be a measure it should be calculated as31 . . .
C1M =
(
1 +
5(
N
2
))N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
rij
The expression above takes into consideration not only all possible pairwise correlations
but also considers all possible correlations while treating 3 firms as a group or 4 firms as
a group; up to N − 1 firms as a group. That is, C1 is calculated for each Ei in Σ above
to form C1M . This measure however, while mathematically correct, is hard to interpret
as it is not bounded above or below and considers the correlation between any possible
pair of firms more than once.
The previous discussion regarding why C1 and C2 are not formal mathematical mea-
sures points to a potential drawback of the “measures”. C1 and C2 are functions of
pair–wise correlations and pair–wise correlation matrix determinants. Thus, given a
group of firms, we can only judge closeness of the group in light of averages of pairs.
Given a group of N firms it would be helpful to not only condition on firm j’s infor-
mation when considering firm i but also to condition on known information about the
other N − 2 firms in the group. Simply averaging pair–wise correlations and pair–wise
correlation matrix determinants may be an inefficient use of available information about
each firm in the group. Another measure, entropy, enjoys the advantage of being count-
ably additive thus qualifying itself as a formal mathematical measure. Entropy is able
to condition information about firm i on information about all of the other N − 1 firms
in the group and is not restricted to conditioning only on information about firm j.
Unfortunately however, it would be beyond the scope of this study to examine measures
of entropy.
30A potential “measure” need not satisfy the properties of a formal mathematical measure in order to
“measure” something.
31C2M should be calculated similarly.
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1.5.2 Other Properties of the Measures
Monotonicity
A measure µ is monotonic if, given two measurable sets E1 and E2 with E1 ⊆ E2,
we have µ(E1) ≤ µ(E2). Neither C1 nor C2 are monotonic.32 Take C2 for example.
Suppose we have Σ as defined earlier with E10 = {2, 4} and E13 = {1, 2, 4}. You can see
that E10 ⊆ E13 and calculating gives C2(E10) = 0.9962 > C2(E13) = 0.7285.
Transitivity
A measure µ is transitive if, given three measurable disjoint sets A, B and C with
µ(A ∪ B) > 0 and µ(B ∪ C) > 0, we have µ(A ∪ C) > 0. Again, neither C1 nor
C2 are transitive.33 To see this it will suffice to prove that the sample Pearson Prod-
uct Moment Correlation r in (8) is not transitive. This is sufficient since C1 and C2 are
simply functions of the Pearson correlation and thus any problems which cause the Pear-
son correlation to not exhibit transitivity will also prohibit C1 and C2 from exhibiting
transitivity. Since I have reduced the transitivity question to showing that the Pearson
correlation fails to exhibit transitivity I will define transitivity with the Pearson corre-
lation in mind. The sample Pearson correlation r is transitive34 if, given three random
variables X, Y and Z with rX,Y > 0 and rY,Z > 0, we have rX,Z > 0.
35 Of course
a simple counterexample which fails to satisfy the definition will suffice to prove the
non–transitivity of the Pearson correlation. The following illustrative example is bor-
rowed from Langford et al. (2001) published in the American Statistician. The authors
collected baseball data from the New York Yankees in the following tabular form . . .
32Of course they aren’t by the fact that they are not formal mathematical measures since they violate
one or more of the conditions given above (i–iii).
33See footnote above.
34Transitivity of the Pearson Correlation can be positive, negative or zero. Without loss of generality I
only discuss the positive transitive case.
35Where rX,Y represents the Pearson correlation between random variables X and Y .
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Table 1.2: Year 2000 Yankees Batters
Player X(triples) Y (base hits) Z(home runs)
Jeter 4 201 15
Williams 6 165 30
Posada 1 145 28
Justice 1 150 41
O’Neill 0 160 18
Knoblauch 2 113 5
Polonia 5 140 7
Martinez 4 147 16
Canseco 0 83 15
Brosius 0 108 16
where X, Y and Z represent the number of triples, base hits and home runs for that
particular player. Calculating gives rX,Y = 0.526, rY,Z = 0.293 and rX,Z = −0.096. The
intuition here is relatively straightforward. One would expect that the more hits a player
has the more triples and home runs they will have. However, it is also not surprising
that the number of triples a player has is negatively correlated with the number of home
runs they have since smaller, faster players (e.g., Polonia) tend to hit triples and not
home runs, whereas larger, more powerful players (e.g., Canseco) tend to hit home runs
and not triples.
The previous example is a specific counterexample illustrating the non–transitivity of
the Pearson correlation where rX,Y > 0 and rY,Z > 0 but rX,Z < 0. A broader example is
the following. If we let P , S and Q be any non–trivial, n–dimensional and independent
vector random variables36 and set X = P + S, Y = S + Q and Z = Q − P with rX,Y
and rY,Z positive. Then rX,Z will be negative. I omit the proof here in the interest of
time and space.
One interesting thing to note however regarding transitivity of the Pearson correlation
is that if we constrain rX,Y and rY,Z such that r
2
X,Y + r
2
Y,Z > 1 then X and Z will be
36i.e. P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} etc.
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positively correlated. See Appendix A for a geometric proof of this.
To relate this discussion regarding the non–transitivity of the Pearson correlation
back to the measures introduced in the study. Non–transitivity implies that if we have
a set of firms X and we choose three disjoint (i.e., mutually exclusive) subsets of firms
A, B and C from X and calculate the closeness measures C1 and C2 then it is not
necessarily the case that if firm–group A∪B are close37 and firm–group B ∪C are close
that firm–group A ∪ C will be close. To illustrate, suppose that A = {i}, B = {j} and
C = {k} (three groups each with one firm). Then, A ∪ B = {i, j}, B ∪ C = {j, k} and
A∪C = {i, k}. Because of the non–transitivity of the Pearson correlation we could have,
for example, cases where the earnings of firms i and j are positively correlated (rij > 0)
and the earnings of firms j and k are positively correlated (rjk > 0) but the earnings of
firms i and k are negatively correlated (rik < 0).
1.5.3 Relationship Between the Measures
Since I know that the determinant of the correlation matrix for two variables is one
less the square of the Pearson correlation between each of the variables, it becomes clear
that the two measures introduced previously have a non–linear relationship. That is, I
have the following . . .
C2AE(r) =
1(
N
2
) N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
|CORRAE(i, j)| =
1(
N
2
) N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
(1− r2i,j)
=
1(
N
2
) − 1(
N
2
) N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
r2i,j
Differentiating C2(r) with respect to r gives . . .
∂C2
∂r
= − 2 ∗ 1(
N
2
) N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ri,j
= − 2 ∗ C1(r)
Thus, interestingly, the derivative of closeness measure two is a linear decreasing function
37Again, there is positive, negative and zero–closeness but non–transitivity applies to every case.
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of closeness measure one. The fact that the derivative of C2 with respect to r is negative is
intuitive. As r increases we know, from the equation on page thirty, that |CORRAE(i, j)|
decreases for all (i, j) pairs. Therefore, C2 decreases since it is an average of decreasing
determinants.
1.6 Limitations of the Measures
Based on the previous theoretical discussion of C1 and C2 at least four limitations
can be identified related to these measures. First, as stated earlier, the measures only
capture a linear closeness relation between a group of firms. To the extent that a non–
linear relation exists within a firm–group, the measures are not fit to capture this since
C1 and C2 are functions of the Pearson Correlation (r) and r is a measure of the linear
association between two variables. This limitation is eased somewhat in the next section
where simulation is used to provide assurance that the measures capture closeness as
defined in the paper.
Second, the measures do not display countable additivity. That is, for a given group
of firms, the closeness of the group is not equal to the sum of the closeness of any
combination of pair–wise disjoint subsets of that group. This is an inconvenience since if
we lose a firm from a group, we have to re–calculate closeness of the new group as a whole
rather than re–calculating only the closeness of the particular subset that contained the
omitted firm (a much easier empirical task).
Third, the measures, since they measure the closeness in ex post financial statement
information, do not control for differences in firm–specific exposure to economic events.
Therefore, one must attempt to control for these differences by putting firms into groups
which have exposure to similar economic events first before calculating the closeness
of the group. The measures are thus not designed to take a population of firms and
optimally parcel them into respectively “close” groups; rather they are designed to, once
given a group of firms, determine how close those firms are based on historical accounting
fundamental co–movement.
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Finally, the measures do not speak to the closeness in accounting functions. That
is, for a given set of economic events (x) that firm i and firm j are both exposed to,
the closeness of these two firms treated as a group could be high when the accounting
functions that each firm employs are vastly different fi 6= fj. This, of course, is only
a limitation however if “closeness” is defined in terms of the closeness in accounting
functions. No “closeness” measure can measure the closeness in accounting functions
and ex post fundamentals simultaneously while controlling for the economic events.
This is mathematically impossible.
1.7 Simulating Closeness
As discussed previously, simulating an earnings process and then applying the close-
ness measures introduced helps to add to the construct validity of the measures. In
simulation space I have an experiment where I can ensure that groups of firms have sim-
ilar earnings processes ex ante (i.e., before the simulation based on the parameter values
set up in the model) and should have correlated abnormal earnings and cash flows ex
post. I can then simulate and apply the measures to those ex post performance summary
variables. Relatively high values of the measures (i.e., relative to what I would expect
ex ante) bolsters confidence that the measures are effective operationalizations of the
closeness construct I wish to capture.
I begin with the framework proposed by Feltham and Ohlson (1996). They consider
a firm with stochastic operating cash flows at a sequence of dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. At
date t the firm receives cash revenue CRt and invests cash CIt, where cash receipts are
a function of prior cash investments. They initially assume that current cash receipts
and investments constitute the only relevant information for predicting future cash flows.
Thus the model is specified below.
CRt+1 = γCRt + κCIt + εCRt+1 (14)
CIt+1 = ωCIt + εCIt+1 (15)
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where εCRt+1 and εCIt+1 are zero–mean stochastic terms (i.e. Et[ε] = 0 for all t ≥ 0). The
model above is fully determined by three parameters γ, κ and ω. κ > 0 represents the
impact of date t cash investments on date t+1 cash receipts. γ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence
in cash receipts. ω ∈ [0, R) represents the expected growth in cash investments and R
represents one plus the risk–free interest rate. Note that from Feltham, Ohlson [1996]
(p. 214, Corollary 1 and also see proof of Proposition 1) if we have zero net–present
value (NPV) investments then γ + κ = R. The rest of the model is as follows 38.
CFt+1 = CRt+1 − CIt+1 (16)
OAt+1 = δOAt + CIt+1 (17)
INCt+1 = CRt+1 − (1− δ)OAt (18)
where CF represents cash flows. OA represents non–cash operating assets with δ ∈ (0, 1)
the accrual accounting choice parameter which can be thought of as 1 minus a (declining
balance) depreciation rate. INC represents accrual accounting income or earnings.
Matlab was used to simulate the time series equations (14) – (18) for ten groups
of firms — each with one hundred firms — for one hundred periods 39. The groups
represent industries in the sense that each group has equal parameter values, and nor-
mally distributed shock terms with equal variance. Kappa is set to satisfy the zero–NPV
condition and R = 1.05 throughout. Finally, I arbitrarily assign CI0 = 100 and initial
values of the other variables equal to their steady state without shocks 40. The following
table summarizes the portion of the parameter space in which the simulations are run.
38FO (1996) have time series equations in their model for firm value and economic income but for
simplicity’s sake I omit these.
39Results were very similar when each group only consisted of ten firms and the number of periods was
ten.
40That is CR0, INC0, CF0 and OA0 are set equal to the value that these variables would approach if
given no shock terms. Mathematical derivation of the steady states is a relatively straightforward
algebra exercise.
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Table 1.3: Simulation Parameters and Shocks
Group N # of Periods R ω = γ = δ κ = R− γ σ2(ε)
1 100 100 1.05 0.99 0.96 0.05
2 100 100 1.05 0.89 0.86 0.10
3 100 100 1.05 0.79 0.76 0.15
4 100 100 1.05 0.69 0.66 0.20
5 100 100 1.05 0.59 0.56 0.25
6 100 100 1.05 0.49 0.46 0.30
7 100 100 1.05 0.39 0.36 0.35
7 100 100 1.05 0.29 0.26 0.40
9 100 100 1.05 0.19 0.16 0.45
10 100 100 1.05 0.09 0.06 0.50
Since I am only concerned with the ability of the measures to capture closeness, I only
need to ensure that groups of firms have similar earnings processes within–group and that
there are between group differences in this initial similarity. Ensuring this will imply that,
post simulation, closeness in abnormal earnings should follow a decreasing trend between
groups since the variance of the shocks is increasing. The reason is that increasing
variance of shocks introduces increasing randomness to each groups’ earnings process
and thus less probability that their abnormal earnings will move together. In fact if there
are no shocks to cash receipts or investments within–group then each group will have
perfectly close abnormal earnings over the one hundred periods since each firm within
a particular group has the same parameter values. Similarly, if each group has shocks
too large then no group will have statistically significantly close abnormal earnings. The
variance of the shocks was arbitrarily assigned so that each groups’ variance only differed
by a very small amount (i.e., 0.05) to see if the measures really can capture differences
in closeness ex post. Furthermore, I would expect ex ante that abnormal cash flows will
have high closeness across the groups and likely will not follow a decreasing trend in
43
closeness as variance of shocks increases. This is due to cash flows simply being cash
receipts less cash investment for the period (see equation 16) and since both cash receipts
and investment are given equal variance shocks within–groups, cash flows will still be
very close (i.e. I expect C1ACF ≈ 1 and C2ACF ≈ 0) within–group due to the small variance
of the shock terms.
Next, I employed a simple lagged time–series earnings and cash flow expectations
model to calculate abnormal earnings and cash flows respectively41. Specifically, I ran
the following cross–sectional linear regressions with θi,t and λi,t assumed to be zero–mean,
random variables.
INCi,t+1 = αi + βi ∗ INCi,t + θi,t (19)
CFi,t+1 = δi + γi ∗ CFi,t + λi,t (20)
Then abnormal earnings and cash flows for each firm in each period (i.e., AEi,t, ACFi,t)
were set equal to their respective fitted residuals from (19) and (20) as follows
AEi,t = θ̂i,t = INCi,t+1 − α̂i − β̂i ∗ INCi,t (21)
ACFi,t = λ̂i,t = CFi,t+1 − δ̂i − γ̂i ∗ CFi,t (22)
Once abnormal earnings and abnormal cash flows were calculated for each firm for
each period, matrices were formed where the columns represented the firms abnormal
earnings or abnormal cash flows and the rows represented the periods. Then the same
procedure as in Examples 1 and 2 was used to calculate the two measures. Upon simu-
lating the above model the following results were obtained.
41Other variations of earnings and cash flow expectations models (e.g., different ARIMA models) were
used to calculate abnormal earnings and cash flows but the results were robust.
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Table 1.4: Closeness Measures from Simulation
Group σ2(εCR) = σ
2(εCI) C
1
AE C
1
ACF C
2
AE C
2
ACF C
1 C2
1 0.05 0.9633 0.9777 0.0720 0.0441 0.9705 0.0580
2 0.10 0.9286 0.9943 0.1377 0.0114 0.9614 0.0745
3 0.15 0.7876 0.9934 0.3788 0.0132 0.8905 0.1960
4 0.20 0.6283 0.9922 0.6027 0.0155 0.8103 0.3091
5 0.25 0.5019 0.9915 0.7433 0.0169 0.7467 0.3801
6 0.30 0.4094 0.9914 0.8262 0.0171 0.7004 0.4217
7 0.35 0.3453 0.9912 0.8727 0.0174 0.6683 0.4451
8 0.40 0.3088 0.9914 0.8965 0.0172 0.6501 0.4568
9 0.45 0.3009 0.9913 0.9010 0.0173 0.6461 0.4592
10 0.50 0.2907 0.9917 0.9066 0.0166 0.6412 0.4616
Several interesting things are evident from the simulation results. First, one can see
that abnormal cash flows don’t change much regarding their closeness across the groups
as I expected ex ante for the reason given. If the variance of the shocks were made larger
I would expect abnormal cash flows to exhibit less closeness across periods. Second, I see
overall that the equally weighted measures C1 and C2 both follow a strictly decreasing
trend of closeness as variances of shocks increase which is what I would expect of a
measure that adequately captures closeness. What is interesting is that the measures do
not follow a linearly decreasing trend of closeness even as the variance of shocks follows
a linearly increasing trend (increasing by 0.05 for each group). I however had no ex ante
expectation regarding how the closeness measures would decrease as variance of shocks
increased, only that the measures would show a strictly decreasing trend. Furthermore I
see that the abnormal earnings component measures capture closeness across the range
of large closeness to small closeness. One can see this by using the above Table 1.4 and
the guidelines from Table 1.1. Finally, using Table 1.1 and Table 1.4 one can see that
the measures are always consistent. That is, when C1 ranked a group in a closeness
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category according to Table 1.1 then C2 also ranked the same group in that closeness
category42. The following graph displays how the closeness measures change with regard
to increasing the variance of the shocks to cash revenue and investment.
Figure 1.2: Closeness Measures
From above, one can see that closeness is a concave decreasing function of the variance
of the shocks to cash receipts and investment for both measures. Furthermore, one
should notice that C2 is decreasing at a faster rate and is slightly more concave than C1
suggesting that C2 is more sensitive to changes in the randomness of the earnings process
(i.e., variance of the shocks). Additional simulations with both larger initial variances
and/or bigger step sizes shows that the concavity diminishes for both measures but
faster for C1. The measures approach a linear decreasing function of the variance on the
shocks as the variances and/or step sizes are increased. The important point though is
42Every group exhibited large closeness with this simulation due to the low relative variance on the shock
terms. Additional simulations with higher shock variances showed that the measures also identify firms
with medium, low and small closeness as one would expect.
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that closeness decreases (as one would expect ex ante) with randomness in the earnings
process across groups of firms. In summary, the simulations provide evidence that the
measures introduced in this study adequately capture the closeness construct as defined.
I will next apply the measures to firms which have been grouped mostly based on
similarity in primary revenue generating activities (i.e. firms grouped according to the
SIC and GIC schemes). This exercise helps to assess whether similarity in primary rev-
enue generating activity implies similarity in financial statements and thus “closeness”
of firm–groups. Researchers often use the SIC and GIC industrial classification schemes
to control for similarity among firms. At best, this seems a rough proxy for the trans-
actions x (see equation (6)) that each firm in the group is exposed to as there are many
firm–specific transactions that are independent of the firms’ primary revenue generating
activity. These existing schemes cannot capture similarity in the way firm–groups pro-
cess their individual sets of economic transactions (fi) and thus cannot capture similarity
in the fundamental outputs of this processing (FinancialStatementsi). The measures
introduced herein can capture similarity in the fundamental outputs and thus researchers
could use them as a second–stage grouping exercise after first forming firm–groups using
the SIC and GIC schemes.
Analysts could also use the measures to help them in forecasting future firm perfor-
mance. Firms grouped according to correlation of financial statement information over
time (as proxied for by correlation in earnings and cash flows) should be easier to analyze
and develop forecasts of future performance. Specifically, knowing that firms i and j are
close would make it easier to forecast firm j’s earnings given firm i’s earnings and vice
versa. The forecast errors for firm–groups exhibiting higher closeness should be lower
than those groups exhibiting lower closeness.
Finally, investors could possibly employ the measures in choosing among investment
portfolio alternatives. More specifically, suppose there are two groups of firms — portfo-
lio A and portfolio B — that one wishes to invest in. Further, suppose that firm–group A
ranks high on closeness measure one and two (i.e. C1 > 0.5, C2 < 0.35) while firm–group
B ranks low (i.e. C1 < 0.3, C2 > 0.6) using the Table 1.1 interpretations. Assuming
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that all firms in group A do not announce earnings at the same time, an investor could
use this knowledge to earn an abnormal return. When firm i from portfolio A announces
earnings the investor could observe how the announced earnings relate to firm i’s mean
earnings over a historical time period. High earnings (relative to this mean) coupled with
the knowledge that the firms in portfolio A have historically highly correlated fundamen-
tals should increase the expected return from a “buy” decision for shares in portfolio A
firms. This of course is assuming that the market fails to take into account the historical
closeness information of portfolio B firms and therefore undervalues these firms at t = 0.
Similarly, if firm i’s earnings announcement is low (relative to mean) an investor could
sell shares in portfolio A firms and incur a smaller loss. The strategy described above is
examined formally in Chapter 3.
Accordingly, an examination of how historical returns relate to firm–group closeness
could speak to the feasibility of the strategy described above. Specifically, if firm–group
cumulative abnormal returns are increasing in firm–group closeness (as measured by C1
and C2 introduced in this study) then the strategy described above would be validated,
at least historically. This idea is examined in Chapter 3.
Copyright © Jonathan Freeman Ross 2012
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Chapter 2: Closeness and Industrial Classification
2.1 Current Industrial Classification Schemes
The four most recognized industrial classification systems are the SIC (Standard In-
dustrial Classification System), GICS (Global Industrial Classification Standard), NAICS
(North American Industrial Classification System) and the FF classification (Fama &
French). It turns out that the NAICS and the FF are just refinements of the SIC.
Weiner (2005) does a good job of describing each of these systems43 so I refer the in-
terested reader to his paper. The main finding in his paper is that on average 30% of
papers published in the top 3 finance and top 2 accounting journals use industrial classi-
fication systems. He finds that the main purposes for using them are sample restriction
(34%), comparable company selection (31%), and detection of industry effects (12%).
Thus there is a demand for a measure of economic relatedness among firms in financial
research and current industrial classification systems have been developed to meet this
demand. Since the SIC is the oldest and most widely used classification system I will
talk a little about the history and methodology of this system as well as the replacement
of this system with the NAICS. Also, the GICS was created with the finance community
in mind and was shown by Bhojraj et al. (2003) to be superior to the SIC, FF and
NAICS at explaining co–movements in stock returns as well as cross–sectional varia-
tions in valuation multiples, research and development expenditures, key financial ratios
and forecasted and realized growth rates. Therefore, I will also discuss the history and
methodology of this system. Analysis in later sections will evaluate the measures in light
of these two classification systems. Therefore, this section seeks to provide the reader
with an introduction to the two systems.
43He gives a short historical background on each system and talks a little about the methodology of
each system.
49
2.1.1 Standard Industrial Classification
In the 1930’s the agencies of the U.S. government had classification schemes to group
establishments44 into homogeneous groups for the purpose of data collection and analysis.
Recommendation was made in 1934 at an Interdepartmental Conference on Industrial
Classification to establish a continuing committee to explore the problems of industrial
classification of statistical data. This recommendation was transmitted to the Central
Statistical Board and in 1937 they established an Interdepartmental Committee on In-
dustrial Classification. The committees’ charge was “to develop a plan of classification
of various types of statistical data by industries and to promote the general adoption
of such classification as the standard classification of the Federal Government.”(Pearce,
1957) Standardization was an important objective since agencies collecting industrial
data used their own classification, and sometimes would thus classify a given establish-
ment into two different industries. The project was designed to classify “industry” in
the broad sense of all economic activity; i.e., agriculture, forestry and fisheries, mining,
construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate,
transportation, communication, electric, gas, sanitary services, and services. Soon after
the committee was formed the first SIC was published in 1939. In 1941 the Central Sta-
tistical Board was transferred to the Bureau of the Budget and it was decided that the
SIC should be evaluated in light of recent changes and revised. New editions of the SIC
were made in 1945, 49, 57, 80 and 1987. In 1997 the Office of Management and Budget
(formerly the Bureau of Budget) developed the North American Industrial Classification
system to replace the SIC and jointly developed the U.S. Economic Classification Policy
Committee (ECPC), Statistics Canada and Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
y Geografia to allow for a high level of comparability in business statistics among North
American countries. Despite the new name, most former SIC industries were still em-
ployed but the ECPC eliminated certain industries that were no longer well–represented
in the current technological environment and also added new industries. The ECPC set
44This was the term used to refer to various entities from small businesses to larger companies.
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a 5–year mandatory revision cycle ensure that the classification continues to reflect the
rapidly changing structure of the economies of North American countries New revisions
to the NAICS thus came out in 2002 and 2007.
The overall methodology of the SIC/NAICS is relatively simple in theory. Entities
are grouped based on similarity of processes and products involved in production. For
example, the first sector in the former SIC and now NAICS system is 11–Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing and Hunting. This sector is comprised of five subsectors and each
subsector is comprised of industries. The first subsector in the 11 industry is 111–
Crop Production. This subsector is comprised of industries which grow crops for food
and fiber. One such industry in this subsector is Oilseed and Grain Farming which is
comprised of entities which are primarily engaged in growing oilseed and/or grain crops
and/or producing oilseed and grain seeds. The NAICS thus uses a six–digit hierarchical
coding system to classify all economic activity into twenty industry sectors45. Five sectors
are mainly goods–producing sectors and fifteen are entirely services–producing sectors.
This six–digit hierarchical structure allows greater coding flexibility than the four–digit
structure of the SIC. This leads to the NAICS identifying 1,170 industries compared to
the 1,004 found in the SIC system.
2.1.2 Global Industrial Classification Standard
In 1999 Standard & Poors (S&P) joined with Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) to form the GICS with the purpose of developing a global standard for grouping
companies into sectors and industries. Being a global company classification standard,
the GICS covers approximately 98% of the world’s equity market capitalization repre-
senting more than 34,000 active companies and 38,000 active securities. According to a
document published by the S&P . . .
The GICS was developed in response to the global financial community’s need
for one complete, consistent set of global sector and industry definitions,
45The first two digits represent the sector, the 3rd digit represents the subsector, the 4th represents the
industry group, the 5th digit represents the industry and the 6th digit represents the country (either
U.S., Canada or Mexico).
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thereby enabling asset owners, asset managers and investment research spe-
cialists to make seamless company, sector and industry comparisons across
countries, regions and globally.
The GICS was thus created with the financial community in mind and is popular
among practitioners. Academics also have begun to rely on the GICS to help with group-
ing comparable firms. The GICS currently consists of 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 67
industries and 147 sub–industries. Under the GICS firms are grouped based on similarity
of primary business activity. Revenues are used as a key measure of primary business
activity but earnings and market perception of a companies’ primary business activity
are also taken into consideration when assigning a company to a sub–industry. The exact
algorithm that S&P uses when assigning a company to a sub–industry is not known as
S&P and MSCI make a strong effort to keep the specifics of their methodology confi-
dential. However we do know that a company is re–assigned to a different industry only
if there is a major corporate action which redefines a company’s main line of business.
Annual reviews are done to assess this possibility for each company.
2.2 Industrial Classification Schemes and Closeness
Current industrial classification schemes have been designed with the goal of group-
ing comparable firms. The dimension of comparability commonly chosen to group firms
is primary revenue generating business activity (GICS), or product and process pro-
duction similarity (SIC/NAICS). There is probably a higher likelihood that accounting
fundamentals for a group of firms with the same primary revenue generating business
activity move similarly than the same fundamentals for a group of firms with different
primary revenue generating business activities. However, one can only assume this is
true. The measures introduced in Chapter 1 provide a way to group firms based on
financial statement accounting information, and not only to group them, but to rank
these groups in terms of closeness. Industrial classification systems simply inform us that
a group of firms is comparable in the sense that they have the same primary revenue
generating business activity, product or production process. However the magnitude of
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comparability is not specified nor the comparability of the groups’ financial statement
information. The implicit assumption with the schemes is that within–industry closeness
is constant across industries. This, as I find, is not necessarily true.
Although the GICS was designed with the financial community in mind, SIC codes
were originally designed for the traditional manufacturing–based economy. For example,
major sectors in the two–digit designation still include mining and agriculture which
play a decreasingly important role in today’s information and service–based economy. It
would thus seem a useful exercise to evaluate the GICS and SIC/NAICS in regards to
their ability to group firms who are close in the accounting information sense described
in Chapter 1. After all if two firms have the same primary revenue generating business
activity but due to firm–specific characteristics have uncorrelated financial statement
information levels over time then does knowing that they are classified in the same
industry really help us? Are these firms really comparable in an accounting information
sense?
The rest of Chapter 2 is devoted to evaluating the SIC/NAICS and GICS classifica-
tion schemes in regards to their ability to group firms who are close in an accounting
information sense as captured in the two measures introduced in Chapter 1. It should be
pointed out that the two measures are useful for the purpose of evaluating the closeness
of a proposed grouping of firms. The development of a new classification scheme based
on the application of the two measures with no constraints would be infeasible since the
correlation between all possible pairs of firms, all possible triplets of firms, and so on
would have to be calculated to determine the optimal grouping of a given number of
firms (i.e. how many groups, how many firms per group and which firms belong in each
group?). One would have to constrain the problem to the extent that the number of
“comparable” firms in a group be set at say 100 for example. Then you could calculate
the two measures for all possible combinations of 100 firms out of the total number of
firms and rank each 100 firm group in terms of closeness. Because of these theoretical
difficulties the measures introduced in this study are best suited to giving the researcher
a way to — once given a group of firms — evaluate the extent to which that group of
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firms is comparable in an ex post fundamental accounting information sense.
2.2.1 Methodology
A search of COMPUSTAT over the time period 1999–2010 produced a sample of
98,922 firm–year observations representing 9,229 firms, each with net income and op-
erating net cash flow data (COMPUSTAT variables NI and OANCF respectively) for
at least one year of the 12–year time period. This particular sample period was chosen
because the GIC was introduced in 1999 and for comparison I didn’t want to examine
industry closeness using different time periods for the SIC and GIC. The sample size
was reduced to 79,934 firm–year observations after deleting firm–years with missing ob-
servations on either net income or operating cash flow. An additional 34,430 firm–year
observations were lost after requiring each firm to have 12 years of net income and op-
erating cash flow observations (e.g. for 1999–2010)46. Finally, 48 firm–year observations
were lost after requiring that each industry (using both the GIC and SIC schemes) have
at least two representing firms. This loss of observations was due to the fact that SIC
two–digit industries 8, 41,81 and 89 only had one representing firm. The final sample
consisted of 45,456 firm–year observations representing 3,788 unique firms.
The final sample was then organized into two–digit SIC industry sectors47 and the
closeness measures were calculated48 for each industry using net income and operating
net cash flow as well as using abnormal net income and operating net cash flow49. This
analysis was repeated after organizing the final sample into 6–digit GIC industries. Ta-
bles 5 and 6 show the two–digit SIC and 6–digit GIC industries represented in the final
sample50. Of the 83 two–digit SIC industries, 66 were represented and all 68 of the GIC
six–digit industries were represented with at least two firms over the sample period.
46In order to calculate the closeness measures, each firm must have the same number of observations.
47I could have also grouped by four–digit to do industry analysis. However, grouping by four–digit
would have led to analyzing many industry samples with 5 firms or less.
48MATLAB was used throughout for analysis.
49Abnormal earnings and operating net cash flow are estimated as the fitted residuals from the lagged
model in equations (19) and (20) used in the simulations in Chapter 1.
50The two–digit SIC scheme aligns with the six–digit GIC scheme in that both levels of granularity
respectively refer to one level of detail finer than the industry sector.
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Table 2.1: SIC two–digit Industries Represented (66/83)
01 - - AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION–CROPS
02 - - AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION–LIVESTOCK
07 - - AGRICULTURAL SERVICES
10 - - METAL MINING
12 - - COAL MINING
13 - - OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION
14 - - NONMETALLIC MINERALS EXCEPT FUELS
15 - - GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
16 - - HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EXCEPT BUILDING
17 - - SPECIAL TRADE CONTRACTORS
20 - - FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
21 - - TOBACCO PRODUCTS
22 - - TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
23 - - APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS
24 - - LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS
25 - - FURNITURE AND FIXTURES
26 - - PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
27 - - PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
28 - - CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
29 - - PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS
30 - - RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS
31 - - LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS
32 - - STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS
33 - - PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
34 - - FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
35 - - INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
36 - - ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT
37 - - TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
38 - - INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS
39 - - MISC. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
40 - - RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION
42 - - TRUCKING AND WAREHOUSING
44 - - WATER TRANSPORTATION
45 - - TRANSPORTATION BY AIR
46 - - PIPELINES, EXCEPT NATURAL GAS
47 - - TRANSPORTATION SERVICES
48 - - COMMUNICATION
49 - - ELECTRIC, GAS, AND SANITARY SERVICES
50 - - WHOLESALE TRADE - DURABLE GOODS
51 - - WHOLESALE TRADE - NONDURABLE GOODS
52 - - BUILDING MATERIALS, HARDWR, GARDEN SUPPLY
53 - - GENERAL MERCHANDISE STORES
55
Table 2.1: Continued
54 - - FOOD STORES
55 - - AUTOMOTIVE DEALERS & SERVICE STATIONS
56 - - APPAREL AND ACCESSORY STORES
57 - - FURNITURE AND HOMEFURNISHINGS STORES
58 - - EATING AND DRINKING PLACES
59 - - MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL
60 - - DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
61 - - NONDEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
62 - - SECURITY AND COMMODITY BROKERS
63 - - INSURANCE CARRIERS
64 - - INSURANCE AGENTS, BROKERS, & SERVICE
65 - - REAL ESTATE
67 - - HOLDING AND OTHER INVESTMENT OFFICES
70 - - HOTELS AND OTHER LODGING PLACES
72 - - PERSONAL SERVICES
73 - - BUSINESS SERVICES
75 - - AUTO REPAIR, SERVICES, AND PARKING
78 - - MOTION PICTURES
79 - - AMUSEMENT & RECREATION SERVICES
80 - - HEALTH SERVICES
82 - - EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
83 - - SOCIAL SERVICES
87 - - ENGINEERING & MANAGEMENT SERVICES
99 - - NONCLASSIFIABLE ESTABLISHMENTS
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Table 2.2: GIC six–digit Industries Represented (68/68)
101010 – ENERGY EQUIPMENT & SERVICES
101020 – OIL, GAS & CONSUMABLE FUELS
151010 – CHEMICALS
151020 – CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
151030 – CONTAINERS & PACKAGING
151040 – METALS & MINING
151050 – PAPER & FOREST PRODUCTS
201010 – AEROSPACE & DEFENSE
201020 – BUILDING PRODUCTS
201030 – CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING
201040 – ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
201050 – INDUSTRIAL CONGLOMERATES
201060 – MACHINERY
201070 – TRADING COMPANIES & DISTRIBUTORS
202010 – COMMERCIAL SERVICES & SUPPLIES
202020 – PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
203010 – AIR FREIGHT & LOGISTICS
203020 – AIRLINES
203030 – MARINE
203040 – ROAD & RAIL
203050 – TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
251010 – AUTO COMPONENTS
251020 – AUTOMOBILES
252010 – HOUSEHOLD DURABLES
252020 – LEISURE EQUIPMENT & PRODUCTS
252030 – TEXTILES, APPAREL & LUXURY GOODS
253010 – HOTELS, RESTAURANTS & LEISURE
253020 – DIVERSIFIED CONSUMER SERVICES
254010 – MEDIA
255010 – DISTRIBUTORS
255020 – INTERNET & CATALOG RETAIL
255030 – MULTILINE RETAIL
255040 – SPECIALTY RETAIL
301010 – FOOD & STAPLES RETAILING
302010 – BEVERAGES
302020 – FOOD PRODUCTS
302030 – TOBACCO
303010 – HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS
303020 – PERSONAL PRODUCTS
351010 – HEALTH CARE EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES
351020 – HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS & SERVICES
351030 – HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY
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Table 2.2: Continued
352010 – BIOTECHNOLOGY
352020 – PHARMACEUTICALS
352030 – LIFE SCIENCES TOOLS & SERVICES
401010 – COMMERCIAL BANKS
401020 – THRIFTS & MORTGAGE FINANCE
402010 – DIVERSIFIED FINANCIAL SERVICES
402020 – CONSUMER FINANCE
402030 – CAPITAL MARKETS
403010 – INSURANCE
404020 – REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
404030 – REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
451010 – INTERNET SOFTWARE & SERVICES
451020 – IT SERVICES
451030 – SOFTWARE
452010 – COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
452020 – COMPUTERS & PERISPHERALS
452030 – ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT & INSTRUMENTS
452040 – OFFICE ELECTRONICS
453010 – SEMICONDUCTORS & SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMENT
501010 – DIVERSIFIED TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES
501020 – WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES
551010 – ELECTRIC UTILITIES
551020 – GAS UTILITIES
551030 – MULTI-UTILITIES
551040 – WATER UTILITIES
551050 – INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS & ENERGY TRADERS
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Firms with extreme observations on either net income or net operating cash flow in
any of the 12 years could bias against closeness depending on the direction and mag-
nitude of these observations. To control for this bias I repeated the method described
earlier after deleting firms with net income and/or net operating cash flow observations
greater than two standard deviations from their respective 12 year means. This trimming
procedure reduced the sample to 11,916 firm–year observations representing 993 unique
firms. In addition several SIC and GIC industries were lost due to the requirement that
at least two firms be present to represent an industry. Accordingly, the trimmed sample
represented 56 of the 83 SIC industries and 63 of the 68 GIC industries.
Finally, I took 10 random samples51 of 250 firms each and calculated the closeness
measures both before deleting outliers and after. I believe the sample size chosen for the
random samples is large enough to ensure that firms from vastly different SIC and GIC
industries are included. The idea behind this procedure was to establish the baseline
closeness of a group of firms with regards to their net income and net operating cash flows
(both realized and unexpected). Ex ante, I would expect the average random 250–firm
sample closeness to be close to zero52. Average SIC/GIC industry closeness could then
be judged in light of this. If the average SIC/GIC industry closeness is not much different
than the closeness of a random group of 250 firms then, either the industrial classification
schemes do little in terms of grouping firms whose fundamentals move similarly, or they
do and my measures fail to adequately capture this similarity53. I expected ex ante
that the closeness of most SIC/GIC industries would be statistically different than zero
because I believe that firms engaging in the same primary revenue generating activity
(and hence in the same industry according to both schemes) likely face somewhat similar
demand and supply–side markets and this would lead to their fundamentals moving at
least somewhat similarly. I didn’t have an expectation though regarding the magnitude
51I collected all the company identifying GVKEYS in a vector and then had MATLAB’s random number
generator generate a pseudorandom number ranging from one to the size of the vector drawn from
a uniform probability distribution. Therefore, in theory, each GVKEY had an equal chance of being
selected
52Close to one for measure two.
53I highly doubt this is the case though as the simulation exercise from Chapter 1 provides strong
evidence that the measures capture closeness as defined.
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of average industry closeness. I do believe though that each schemes’ methodology (i.e.
basically grouping firms with similar primary revenue generating activities) is neither
necessary nor sufficient for grouping firms whose fundamentals are correlated over time.
2.2.2 SIC Results
Some interesting results emerge upon analysis54. First, average SIC industry closeness
using measure one with unexpected earnings and net operating cash flows is 0.091855.
Using Table 1.1 I interpret this result to mean that on average, there is no relationship
between a group of firms’ unexpected earnings and unexpected net operating cash flows
formed according to the SIC scheme. Measure two yields the same inference in that
the average SIC industry closeness with unexpected earnings and net operating cash
flows is 0.8684. I am using Table 1.1 to interpret the results as it is simpler to use
and somewhat intuitive. The drawback to Table 1.1 however is that it is a somewhat
arbitrary classification of the cutoffs for C1 and C2. Accordingly, hypothesis tests were
done for each industry where the null hypothesis was that the closeness of the industry
was not statistically significantly different from zero (from one if measure two was used).
P–values were then calculated and results from this analysis were that 37/66 industries
exhibited statistically significant closeness at the 10% level or better while the other
29/66 did not.
54See Appendix D for a more concise summary of the results for the SIC, GIC and random sampling
procedure.
55See Table 1.1 for interpretation cutoffs for measure one and measure two.
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Below is a table summarizing the results for the SIC classification using closeness measure
one with unexpected earnings and net operating cash flows56.
Table 2.3: C1A Measure Results for SIC
SIC Code Sample Size C1AE C
1
ACF C
1
A p-value
1 9 0.1236 0.0097 0.0666 0.2470
2 2 -0.1149 -0.0018 -0.0583 0.6055
7 2 0.3056 0.2430 0.2743 0.0985 *
10 98 0.0383 0.0002 0.0192 0.2551
12 9 -0.0116 0.0048 -0.0034 0.5140
13 146 0.1510 0.1789 0.1650 0.0000 ***
14 12 0.0270 -0.0147 0.0062 0.4707
15 17 0.3775 0.2981 0.3378 0.0000 ***
16 14 0.0465 0.1265 0.0865 0.1327
17 8 0.2686 0.1176 0.1931 0.0296 **
20 90 0.0755 0.0961 0.0858 0.0024 ***
21 7 0.2055 0.0011 0.1033 0.1754
22 10 0.2001 0.1031 0.1516 0.0493 **
23 28 0.0718 0.0775 0.0747 0.0861 *
24 23 0.1441 0.1661 0.1551 0.0049 ***
25 21 0.0857 0.0193 0.0525 0.2036
26 35 0.0928 0.1500 0.1214 0.0064 ***
27 32 0.1546 0.0072 0.0809 0.0568 *
28 328 0.0175 0.0222 0.0198 0.1066
29 31 0.3551 0.2161 0.2856 0.0000 ***
30 25 0.0136 0.0990 0.0563 0.1658
31 15 0.1221 0.0857 0.1039 0.0827 *
32 22 0.1209 0.0281 0.0745 0.1140
33 47 0.2738 0.0865 0.1801 0.0000 ***
34 50 0.0905 0.0638 0.0772 0.0294 **
35 199 0.1398 0.0445 0.0921 0.0000 ***
36 319 0.1164 0.0267 0.0716 0.0000 ***
37 84 0.1319 0.0161 0.0740 0.0094 ***
38 229 0.0426 0.0370 0.0398 0.0184 **
39 26 0.0115 -0.0018 0.0049 0.4658
40 10 0.2424 0.1488 0.1956 0.0160 **
42 27 0.2307 0.0948 0.1627 0.0016 ***
56Note that C1A is simply the equally–weighted average of C
1
AE and C
1
ACF .
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Table 2.3: Continued
SIC Code Sample Size C1AE C
1
ACF C
1
A p-value
44 23 0.2211 0.0894 0.1552 0.0049 ***
45 23 0.2984 0.1645 0.2315 0.0000 ***
46 5 0.2695 0.5280 0.3988 0.0007 ***
47 11 0.3239 0.0274 0.1757 0.0219 **
48 132 0.0867 0.0723 0.0795 0.0008 ***
49 257 0.0571 0.1169 0.0870 0.0000 ***
50 80 0.1270 0.0823 0.1047 0.0006 ***
51 43 0.0503 0.0803 0.0653 0.0693 *
52 5 0.2117 -0.0029 0.1044 0.2145
53 24 0.0848 0.0787 0.0817 0.0834 *
54 25 0.0008 0.0930 0.0469 0.2091
55 18 0.2104 0.0050 0.1077 0.0573 *
56 38 0.0761 0.0784 0.0773 0.0497 **
57 14 -0.0031 0.0414 0.0192 0.4027
58 39 0.0793 0.0314 0.0553 0.1162
59 47 0.1101 0.0400 0.0750 0.0375 **
60 13 0.1880 0.0043 0.0962 0.1164
61 48 0.1731 0.0190 0.0961 0.0105 **
62 51 0.1214 0.0331 0.0772 0.0281 **
63 114 0.3362 0.0814 0.2088 0.0000 ***
64 14 0.0481 -0.0471 0.0005 0.4975
65 39 0.0138 0.0055 0.0097 0.4174
67 165 0.0617 0.0548 0.0583 0.0048 ***
70 11 0.0988 -0.0606 0.0191 0.4142
72 12 -0.0331 0.0112 -0.0109 0.5517
73 345 0.0906 0.0495 0.0701 0.0000 ***
75 9 0.0755 0.0650 0.0703 0.2354
78 11 -0.0215 -0.0569 -0.0392 0.6721
79 40 0.0654 0.0084 0.0369 0.2098
80 50 0.0067 0.0704 0.0386 0.1728
82 13 -0.0184 0.0032 -0.0076 0.5375
83 6 -0.0791 0.1604 0.0406 0.3677
87 66 0.0464 0.0428 0.0446 0.1049
99 22 0.0322 0.0336 0.0329 0.2973
MEAN: 57 0.1146 0.0690 0.0918
MEDIAN: 25 0.0906 0.0470 0.0761
MAX: 345 0.3775 0.5280 0.3988
MIN: 2 -0.1149 -0.0606 -0.0583
VAR: 6447 0.0117 0.0080 0.0072
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Several interesting results emerge from Table 2.3 above. First, we see that average
closeness of the industries using abnormal earnings (C1AE) is higher (0.1146) than using
abnormal net operating cash flows (0.0690). This makes intuitive sense as one would
surmise that since earnings smooth cash flows, unexpected earnings should also be more
highly correlated than unexpected cash flows across time within–industry. Second, the
industry with the highest closeness was SIC code 46 or Pipelines, Except Natural Gas (see
Table 2.5 for reference) at 0.3988. This of course is statistically significantly different than
zero at the 1% level (p–value 0.0007) and ranks as “medium” closeness according to Table
1.1. This industry however was only represented by 5 firms which had the required data
available over the twelve–year time frame 1999-2010. Third, several industries exhibited
negative closeness but none of these were statistically less than zero. Fourth, there were
two industries represented by only two firms (SIC codes 02 and 07), so closeness inferences
for these industries are limited. Fifth, several industries (e.g. SIC codes 55, 60, 61 and
63) have much higher closeness in unexpected earnings than unexpected net operating
cash flows which likely implies that these industries are smoothing earnings to a greater
extent than other industries. Sixth, the difference in industry closeness across industries
is sometimes very large; counterintuitive to the notion that the SIC’s grouping scheme
ensures that within–industry similarity is mostly constant across industries. Finally,
with almost half of the industries having closeness not statistically different from zero
(29
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at the 10% level or greater), and average closeness over the SIC industries of 0.0918,
it appears that the SIC does a poor job of grouping firms whose unexpected earnings
and net operating cash flows move similarly over time.
The table below gives the results for the SIC scheme using measure two with un-
expected earnings and net operating cash flow. In interpreting the results, the reader
should remember that measure two is bounded between 0 and 1 with closeness decreasing
over this range.
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Table 2.4: C2A Measure Results for SIC
SIC Code Sample Size C2AE C
2
ACF C
2
A p-value
1 9 0.9071 0.9076 0.9074 0.1706
2 2 0.9868 1.0000 0.9934 0.4879
7 2 0.9066 0.9409 0.9238 0.3632
10 98 0.8658 0.8616 0.8637 0.0000 ***
12 9 0.8407 0.8402 0.8404 0.0496 **
13 146 0.8032 0.8053 0.8042 0.0000 ***
14 12 0.9068 0.8912 0.8990 0.1145
15 17 0.5298 0.7992 0.6645 0.0000 ***
16 14 0.8580 0.8932 0.8756 0.0542 *
17 8 0.7593 0.9228 0.8410 0.0610 *
20 90 0.8765 0.8701 0.8733 0.0000 ***
21 7 0.8504 0.9041 0.8772 0.1334
22 10 0.8436 0.9162 0.8799 0.0959 *
23 28 0.8886 0.8917 0.8901 0.0221 **
24 23 0.8647 0.8654 0.8651 0.0124 **
25 21 0.8765 0.8958 0.8861 0.0356 **
26 35 0.8700 0.8863 0.8782 0.0062 ***
27 32 0.8307 0.9035 0.8671 0.0045 ***
28 328 0.8891 0.8901 0.8896 0.0000 ***
29 31 0.7533 0.7354 0.7443 0.0000 ***
30 25 0.8917 0.8860 0.8888 0.0272 **
31 15 0.9090 0.8693 0.8892 0.0694 *
32 22 0.8738 0.8900 0.8819 0.0276 **
33 47 0.8077 0.8722 0.8399 0.0001 ***
34 50 0.8697 0.8782 0.8740 0.0010 ***
35 199 0.8559 0.8902 0.8731 0.0000 ***
36 319 0.8705 0.8889 0.8797 0.0000 ***
37 84 0.8546 0.8854 0.8700 0.0000 ***
38 229 0.8877 0.8926 0.8902 0.0000 ***
39 26 0.8883 0.8800 0.8841 0.0204 **
40 10 0.8500 0.8139 0.8319 0.0332 **
42 27 0.8384 0.8800 0.8592 0.0055 ***
44 23 0.8240 0.8705 0.8472 0.0055 ***
45 23 0.8206 0.8048 0.8127 0.0009 ***
46 5 0.8467 0.6825 0.7646 0.0351 **
47 11 0.7832 0.8618 0.8225 0.0208 **
48 132 0.8744 0.8889 0.8817 0.0000 ***
49 257 0.8952 0.8803 0.8878 0.0000 ***
50 80 0.8575 0.8765 0.8670 0.0000 ***
51 43 0.8807 0.8796 0.8801 0.0032 ***
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Table 2.4: Continued
SIC Code Sample Size C2AE C
2
ACF C
2
A p-value
52 5 0.8272 0.8212 0.8242 0.0900 *
53 24 0.8791 0.8774 0.8783 0.0195 **
54 25 0.9123 0.8893 0.9008 0.0431 **
55 18 0.8076 0.8906 0.8491 0.0132 **
56 38 0.8550 0.8907 0.8729 0.0033 ***
57 14 0.8574 0.9171 0.8873 0.0730 *
58 39 0.8761 0.8944 0.8852 0.0065 ***
59 47 0.8766 0.8735 0.8750 0.0015 ***
60 13 0.8499 0.8974 0.8736 0.0580 *
61 48 0.8138 0.8945 0.8541 0.0002 ***
62 51 0.8408 0.8831 0.8620 0.0003 ***
63 114 0.7793 0.8835 0.8314 0.0000 ***
64 14 0.8939 0.8974 0.8956 0.0892 *
65 39 0.8948 0.8837 0.8893 0.0083 ***
67 165 0.8740 0.8861 0.8801 0.0000 ***
70 11 0.8272 0.8871 0.8571 0.0512 *
72 12 0.9105 0.8742 0.8923 0.0997 *
73 345 0.8798 0.8874 0.8836 0.0000 ***
75 9 0.8702 0.9378 0.9040 0.1619
78 11 0.9225 0.9038 0.9131 0.1614
79 40 0.8717 0.8832 0.8774 0.0036 ***
80 50 0.9021 0.8894 0.8958 0.0053 ***
82 13 0.8957 0.8918 0.8937 0.0935 *
83 6 0.8614 0.8836 0.8725 0.1435
87 66 0.8868 0.8957 0.8912 0.0011 ***
99 22 0.8711 0.9012 0.8861 0.0323 **
MEAN: 57 0.8579 0.8789 0.8684
MEDIAN: 25 0.8701 0.8867 0.8778
MAX: 345 0.9868 1.0000 0.9934
MIN 2 0.5298 0.6825 0.6645
VAR: 6447 0.0032 0.0019 0.0019
Results using measure two for industry closeness are very similar as when measure one
is used. Again, average industry closeness is “none” using Table 1.1 for interpretation of
the 0.8684 mean industry closeness. Furthermore, p–values from a hypothesis statistical
significance test of whether C2 is different than 1 are mostly significant at the 10% level
or greater (e.g. 58/66 are less than 0.1). Thus measure two provides slightly stronger
evidence than measure one that the SIC groups firms whose unexpected fundamentals are
correlated over time. Other inferences from the measure one results discussed earlier also
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hold when measure two is employed. Finally, using the interpretation cutoffs from Table
1.1, measure one and measure two agree 83% (55/66) of the time and never disagreed
by more than one cutoff57.
The main result using measure one and two with unexpected earnings and net op-
erating cash flows discussed above is for the untrimmed sample. Extreme outliers on
earnings and/or net operating cash flows in any given firm–year could definitely bias
against closeness unless the outliers occur, for each firm in a given industry, in the same
year and in the same direction. These outliers could be an error in the data set or actu-
ally be correct and due to some firm–specific economic event. Regardless of the reason
however I recalculated the results after trimming the sample of firm–year observations
such that, for each firm, any observation on earnings or net operating cash flow that was
greater than two standard deviations from their respective means was deleted. Results
using the trimmed sample are similar to those using the untrimmed sample. Specifically,
average SIC industry closeness using measure one with unexpected earnings and net
operating cash flows is 0.1520. Using Table 1.1, this result can be interpreted that the
SIC groups firms into industries which exhibit, on average, small co–movement in unex-
pected earnings and net operating cash flows if we first delete any firms in each industry
which have earnings or net operating cash flows greater than two standard deviations
from their respective means over a given time period. Again, measure two yields the
same interpretation since average SIC industry closeness using unexpected earnings and
net operating cash flows with the trimmed sample is 0.8479 or “small” according to Table
1.1. Furthermore, 29/56 of the SIC industries exhibited closeness statistically different
than zero while 27/56 did not using measure one. Also, as with the untrimmed sample,
measure two results with the trimmed sample show a higher proportion of industries
whose closeness is not statistically different than 1 (e.g. 42/56 of the p–values are less
than 0.1).
I have thus far discussed the results for the SIC scheme using both measures of
57There was never a case where measure one implied closeness was “none” and measure two implied
closeness was “medium” for example.
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closeness with unexpected fundamentals. I repeated the analysis using realized earnings
and net operating cash flows. Table 2.5 below reports these results for measure one.
Table 2.5: C1 Measure Results for SIC
SIC Code Sample Size C1E C
1
CF C
1 p-value
1 9 0.0647 0.1128 0.0888 0.1809
2 2 -0.0647 0.1766 0.0559 0.3987
7 2 0.8817 0.7863 0.8340 0.0000 ***
10 98 0.0339 0.0066 0.0203 0.2437
12 9 -0.0499 0.2422 0.0961 0.1616
13 146 0.1424 0.4018 0.2721 0.0000 ***
14 12 0.0338 0.0881 0.0609 0.2344
15 17 0.4108 0.3741 0.3925 0.0000 ***
16 14 0.1140 0.2503 0.1821 0.0090 ***
17 8 0.2503 0.0996 0.1750 0.0441 **
20 90 0.1693 0.2046 0.1869 0.0000 ***
21 7 0.0397 -0.0080 0.0159 0.4432
22 10 0.2080 0.0573 0.1327 0.0745 *
23 28 0.0535 0.1146 0.0841 0.0621 *
24 23 0.1787 0.1484 0.1635 0.0032 ***
25 21 0.1402 0.0565 0.0984 0.0597 *
26 35 0.0977 0.1499 0.1238 0.0055 ***
27 32 0.1189 0.0942 0.1065 0.0185 **
28 328 0.0152 0.0328 0.0240 0.0661 *
29 31 0.4601 0.5169 0.4885 0.0000 ***
30 25 0.0505 0.1829 0.1167 0.0217 **
31 15 0.1195 0.1130 0.1162 0.0602 *
32 22 0.1188 0.1029 0.1109 0.0361 **
33 47 0.2923 0.1490 0.2206 0.0000 ***
34 50 0.0947 0.1096 0.1022 0.0061 **
35 199 0.1344 0.1006 0.1175 0.0000 ***
36 319 0.1165 0.0631 0.0898 0.0000 ***
37 84 0.0875 0.0373 0.0624 0.0238 **
38 229 0.0810 0.1175 0.0992 0.0000 ***
39 26 0.0098 0.0282 0.0190 0.3694
40 10 0.3147 0.3788 0.3467 0.0000 ***
42 27 0.2450 0.2607 0.2529 0.0000 ***
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Table 2.5: Continued
SIC Code Sample Size C1E C
1
CF C
1 p-value
44 23 0.2730 0.2756 0.2743 0.0000 ***
45 23 0.2909 0.2547 0.2728 0.0000 ***
46 5 0.5991 0.8216 0.7103 0.0000 ***
47 11 0.3575 0.3445 0.3510 0.0000 ***
48 132 0.1187 0.2555 0.1871 0.0000 ***
49 257 0.1699 0.2627 0.2163 0.0000 ***
50 80 0.1762 0.1054 0.1408 0.0000 ***
51 43 0.1292 0.1488 0.1390 0.0008 ***
52 5 0.4266 0.2502 0.3384 0.0039 ***
53 24 0.1238 0.1557 0.1398 0.0088 ***
54 25 0.1529 0.3084 0.2306 0.0000 ***
55 18 0.1411 0.1011 0.1211 0.0378 **
56 38 0.0804 0.2185 0.1494 0.0007 ***
57 14 -0.0169 0.0042 -0.0063 0.5323
58 39 0.0804 0.2342 0.1573 0.0003 ***
59 47 0.1391 0.2066 0.1728 0.0000 ***
60 13 0.3513 0.1088 0.2300 0.0019 ***
61 48 0.1458 0.0448 0.0953 0.0111 **
62 51 0.0892 0.0841 0.0867 0.0160 **
63 114 0.3157 0.1732 0.2444 0.0000 ***
64 14 0.1907 0.1142 0.1525 0.0242 **
65 39 0.0497 0.0079 0.0288 0.2671
67 165 0.0762 0.1459 0.1111 0.0000 ***
70 11 0.0662 -0.0598 0.0032 0.4856
72 12 -0.0535 -0.0216 -0.0375 0.6721
73 345 0.1521 0.1996 0.1758 0.0000 ***
75 9 0.0703 0.2566 0.1634 0.0455 **
78 11 -0.0273 0.0076 -0.0099 0.5446
79 40 0.0698 0.0495 0.0596 0.0961 *
80 50 0.2117 0.3562 0.2840 0.0000 ***
82 13 0.1344 0.1248 0.1296 0.0534 *
83 6 -0.0848 -0.0156 -0.0502 0.6618
87 66 0.1262 0.1533 0.1397 0.0000 ***
99 22 0.0919 0.0986 0.0952 0.0614 *
MEAN: 57 0.1542 0.1716 0.1629
MEDIAN: 25 0.1216 0.1354 0.1311
MAX: 345 0.8817 0.8216 0.8340
MIN 2 -0.0848 -0.0598 -0.0502
VAR: 6447 0.0249 0.0260 0.0227
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Table 2.5 shows that SIC industry closeness is slightly greater when realized funda-
mentals are used in the measures rather than unexpected fundamentals since average
industry closeness is 0.1629, up from 0.0918 as seen in Table 2.3. Consistent with this,
we also see that 53/66 or 80% of the industries exhibited closeness statistically different
than zero. Also, one should notice that the closeness in cash flows (0.1716) above is
greater than the closeness in earnings (0.1542). This result is counterintuitive since I
would expect average earnings across industries to be closer than average net operating
cash flows due to the fact that accruals help earnings to smooth cash flows. Although
this difference is observed, a t–test of the difference between these two means yields a
p–value of 0.52 which is not enough to reject the null hypothesis that there is a statistical
difference between average earnings and net operating cash flow closeness respectively58.
Table 2.6 following reports the results for the SIC scheme using measure two with
realized earnings and net operating cash flows.
Table 2.6: C2 Measure Results for SIC
SIC Code Sample Size C2E C
2
CF C
2 p-value
1 9 0.9080 0.8882 0.8981 0.1474
2 2 0.9958 0.9688 0.9823 0.4677
7 2 0.2226 0.3818 0.3022 0.0000 ***
10 98 0.8535 0.7654 0.8094 0.0000 ***
12 9 0.6956 0.6143 0.6550 0.0001 ***
13 146 0.7806 0.6110 0.6958 0.0000 ***
14 12 0.8965 0.8221 0.8593 0.0463 **
15 17 0.4492 0.7714 0.6103 0.0000 ***
16 14 0.7783 0.8414 0.8099 0.0067 ***
17 8 0.8186 0.9094 0.8640 0.0934 *
20 90 0.7714 0.8037 0.7876 0.0000 ***
21 7 0.7711 0.6855 0.7283 0.0061 ***
22 10 0.8244 0.8903 0.8574 0.0602 *
58Analysis of the medians yields similar results and thus the slight skewness of the sample is not enough
to change the inferences.
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Table 2.6: Continued
SIC Code Sample Size C2E C
2
CF C
2 p-value
23 28 0.8067 0.8370 0.8218 0.0005 ***
24 23 0.8388 0.8459 0.8424 0.0043 ***
25 21 0.8536 0.8707 0.8621 0.0143 **
26 35 0.8667 0.8503 0.8585 0.0018 ***
27 32 0.8417 0.8366 0.8392 0.0008 ***
28 328 0.8374 0.8197 0.8285 0.0000 ***
29 31 0.6622 0.5850 0.6236 0.0000 ***
30 25 0.8482 0.8422 0.8452 0.0036 ***
31 15 0.8082 0.8373 0.8228 0.0086 ***
32 22 0.8330 0.8601 0.8465 0.0062 ***
33 47 0.7701 0.8183 0.7942 0.0000 ***
34 50 0.8308 0.8455 0.8382 0.0000 ***
35 199 0.8341 0.8423 0.8382 0.0000 ***
36 319 0.8539 0.8549 0.8544 0.0000 ***
37 84 0.8277 0.8417 0.8347 0.0000 ***
38 229 0.8230 0.8075 0.8153 0.0000 ***
39 26 0.8226 0.8309 0.8267 0.0010 ***
40 10 0.6193 0.5881 0.6037 0.0000 ***
42 27 0.8110 0.7893 0.8001 0.0001 ***
44 23 0.7763 0.7593 0.7678 0.0000 ***
45 23 0.8241 0.7738 0.7990 0.0004 ***
46 5 0.5871 0.3176 0.4524 0.0000 ***
47 11 0.7266 0.7046 0.7156 0.0004 ***
48 132 0.8505 0.7349 0.7927 0.0000 ***
49 257 0.7972 0.7975 0.7974 0.0000 ***
50 80 0.8065 0.8534 0.8300 0.0000 ***
51 43 0.8458 0.8544 0.8501 0.0003 ***
52 5 0.7480 0.7299 0.7390 0.0218 **
53 24 0.8108 0.7479 0.7794 0.0001 ***
54 25 0.7978 0.6792 0.7385 0.0000 ***
55 18 0.7689 0.8314 0.8001 0.0016 ***
56 38 0.8304 0.7938 0.8121 0.0000 ***
57 14 0.7209 0.8202 0.7705 0.0013 ***
58 39 0.8261 0.7424 0.7843 0.0000 ***
59 47 0.7873 0.7780 0.7826 0.0000 ***
60 13 0.6961 0.8450 0.7706 0.0019 ***
61 48 0.8255 0.8552 0.8404 0.0001 ***
62 51 0.8363 0.8641 0.8502 0.0001 ***
63 114 0.7723 0.7928 0.7825 0.0000 ***
64 14 0.7881 0.7572 0.7726 0.0015 ***
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Table 2.6: Continued
SIC Code Sample Size C2E C
2
CF C
2 p-value
65 39 0.8782 0.8590 0.8686 0.0022 ***
67 165 0.8337 0.7679 0.8008 0.0000 ***
70 11 0.8258 0.9001 0.8630 0.0586 *
72 12 0.9105 0.8523 0.8814 0.0785 *
73 345 0.8257 0.7740 0.7998 0.0000 ***
75 9 0.8880 0.7932 0.8406 0.0497 **
78 11 0.9259 0.7738 0.8498 0.0429 **
79 40 0.8633 0.8400 0.8516 0.0005 ***
80 50 0.7651 0.6789 0.7220 0.0000 ***
82 13 0.7922 0.7150 0.7536 0.0009 ***
83 6 0.8251 0.7845 0.8048 0.0502 *
87 66 0.8230 0.8354 0.8292 0.0000 ***
99 22 0.8637 0.8730 0.8684 0.0162 **
MEAN: 57 0.7969 0.7854 0.7912
MEDIAN: 25 0.8236 0.8190 0.8110
MAX: 345 0.9958 0.9688 0.9823
MIN 2 0.2226 0.3176 0.3022
VAR: 6447 0.0115 0.0118 0.0100
Inferences using measure two to capture SIC industry closeness with realized funda-
mentals are similar to those using measure one. Specifically average closeness (0.7912) is
greater than when unexpected fundamentals were used with measure two (0.8684). Also,
average cash flow closeness (0.7854) is slightly greater than average earnings closeness
(0.7969) — something I would not expect — however the difference is not statistically
significant (p–value 0.54). Furthermore, we see that 64/66 or 97% of the industries had
closeness statistically different than 1 (of course remember again that 1 represents no
closeness using measure two). Finally, comparing Tables 9 and 10 we see that measure
one and two agreed 44/66 or 67% of the time and most of the time they did disagree, mea-
sure two reported closeness as “small” while measure one reported closeness as “none”
using the cutoffs from Table 1.1.
Tables 9 and 10 report the results for the untrimmed sample. Trimmed sample results
however are much stronger in favor of the SIC grouping firms whose fundamentals move
together over time. For example, average industry closeness for measures one and two
with realized fundamentals for the trimmed sample are 0.3543 and 0.6615 respectively.
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Also, a high proportion of industries displayed closeness statistically different than zero
at the 10% level or greater (47/56 and 52/56 for measures one and two respectively).
Comparing Tables 7–10 one sees that the SIC scheme groups firms whose realized
fundamentals are closer on average than their unexpected fundamentals. Average indus-
try closeness is interpreted as “small” for both measures when realized fundamentals are
used (C1 = 0.1629 and C2 = 0.7912) versus “none” for both measures when unexpected
fundamentals are used (C1 = 0.0918 and C2 = 0.8684). Also, a higher percentage of
industries have closeness statistically different than zero when realized fundamentals are
used59.
2.2.3 GIC Results
Analysis of the industries formed using the GIC scheme yields almost identical re-
sults as seen with the SIC scheme. As with the SIC, the GIC scheme groups firms
whose realized fundamentals are closer than their unexpected fundamentals both with
the trimmed and untrimmed sample. Also, GIC industries are closer on average with
the trimmed sample than seen with the untrimmed sample. Furthermore, the proportion
of GIC industries which have closeness statistically different than zero follows the same
patterns as with the SIC industry results discussed earlier.
2.2.4 Random Sample Results
As discussed earlier, I wanted to know the closeness of randomly selected groups
of firms from the sample to see how average SIC/GIC industry closeness compares to
this. The following tables report the closeness measure results from selecting 10 random
samples of 250 firms each60 from the trimmed and untrimmed samples respectively.
5953/66 and 64/66 for measures one and two respectively with realized fundamentals versus 37/66 and
58/66 respectively with unexpected fundamentals.
60In case the choice of a larger random sample biases against closeness, the measures were also calculated
for 10 random samples of 56 firms each with similar results. The average number of firms in an SIC
and GIC industry was 56, hence the reason for this choice.
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Table 2.7: C1A & C
2
A Results for Random Sampling Procedure
Sample N C1AE C
1
ACF C
1
A p-value C
2
AE C
2
ACF C
2
A p-value
1 250 0.0453 0.0196 0.0325 0.0378 ** 0.8862 0.8940 0.8901 0.0000 ***
2 250 0.0452 0.0239 0.0346 0.0292 ** 0.8844 0.8941 0.8893 0.0000 ***
3 250 0.0525 0.0249 0.0387 0.0171 ** 0.8842 0.8928 0.8885 0.0000 ***
4 250 0.0426 0.0263 0.0344 0.0296 ** 0.8869 0.8930 0.8899 0.0000 ***
5 250 0.0499 0.0219 0.0359 0.0246 ** 0.8837 0.8875 0.8856 0.0000 ***
6 250 0.0686 0.0364 0.0525 0.0020 *** 0.8808 0.8908 0.8858 0.0000 ***
7 250 0.0561 0.0161 0.0361 0.0241 ** 0.8814 0.8911 0.8863 0.0000 ***
8 250 0.0460 0.0253 0.0356 0.0255 ** 0.8792 0.8936 0.8864 0.0000 ***
9 250 0.0654 0.0293 0.0473 0.0048 *** 0.8834 0.8942 0.8888 0.0000 ***
10 250 0.0636 0.0289 0.0463 0.0056 *** 0.8793 0.8904 0.8849 0.0000 ***
MEAN: 0.0535 0.0252 0.0394 0.8830 0.8922 0.8876
MEDIAN: 0.0512 0.0251 0.0360 0.8835 0.8929 0.8875
MAX: 0.0686 0.0364 0.0525 0.8869 0.8942 0.8901
MIN: 0.0426 0.0161 0.0325 0.8792 0.8875 0.8849
VAR: 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 2.8: C1 & C2 Results for Random Sampling Procedure
Sample N C1E C
1
CF C
1 p-value C2E C
2
CF C
2 p-value
1 250 0.0642 0.0935 0.0789 0.0000 *** 0.8428 0.8188 0.8308 0.0000 ***
2 250 0.0771 0.0936 0.0853 0.0000 *** 0.8386 0.8281 0.8333 0.0000 ***
3 250 0.0746 0.0866 0.0806 0.0000 *** 0.8448 0.8227 0.8337 0.0000 ***
4 250 0.0567 0.0920 0.0744 0.0000 *** 0.8270 0.8067 0.8169 0.0000 ***
5 250 0.0846 0.1057 0.0951 0.0000 *** 0.8283 0.8236 0.8260 0.0000 ***
6 250 0.0936 0.1220 0.1078 0.0000 *** 0.8433 0.8260 0.8347 0.0000 ***
7 250 0.0824 0.1046 0.0935 0.0000 *** 0.8373 0.8066 0.8220 0.0000 ***
8 250 0.0731 0.1189 0.0960 0.0000 *** 0.8376 0.8193 0.8285 0.0000 ***
9 250 0.0837 0.1147 0.0992 0.0000 *** 0.8434 0.8193 0.8314 0.0000 ***
10 250 0.0926 0.1111 0.1019 0.0000 *** 0.8319 0.8271 0.8295 0.0000 ***
MEAN: 0.0783 0.1043 0.0913 0.8375 0.8198 0.8287
MEDIAN: 0.0798 0.1051 0.0943 0.8381 0.8210 0.8301
MAX: 0.0936 0.1220 0.1078 0.8448 0.8281 0.8347
MIN: 0.0567 0.0866 0.0744 0.8270 0.8066 0.8169
VAR: 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
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Table 2.9: C1A & C
2
A Results for Random Sampling Procedure (trimmed)
Sample N C1AE C
1
ACF C
1
A p-value C
2
AE C
2
ACF C
2
A p-value
1 250 0.0578 0.0278 0.0428 0.0095 *** 0.8788 0.8920 0.8854 0.0000 ***
2 250 0.0609 0.0336 0.0472 0.0049 *** 0.8847 0.8931 0.8889 0.0000 ***
3 250 0.0812 0.0359 0.0586 0.0007 *** 0.8779 0.8919 0.8849 0.0000 ***
4 250 0.0777 0.0337 0.0557 0.0011 *** 0.8795 0.8918 0.8857 0.0000 ***
5 250 0.0668 0.0281 0.0474 0.0047 *** 0.8824 0.8918 0.8871 0.0000 ***
6 250 0.0652 0.0366 0.0509 0.0027 *** 0.8865 0.8948 0.8907 0.0000 ***
7 250 0.0747 0.0342 0.0544 0.0014 *** 0.8812 0.8910 0.8861 0.0000 ***
8 250 0.0692 0.0331 0.0512 0.0025 *** 0.8818 0.8914 0.8866 0.0000 ***
9 250 0.0556 0.0327 0.0441 0.0078 *** 0.8816 0.8913 0.8864 0.0000 ***
10 250 0.0795 0.0292 0.0543 0.0015 *** 0.8794 0.8910 0.8852 0.0000 ***
MEAN: 0.0689 0.0325 0.0507 0.8814 0.8920 0.8867
MEDIAN: 0.0680 0.0333 0.0510 0.8814 0.8918 0.8862
MAX: 0.0812 0.0366 0.0586 0.8865 0.8948 0.8907
MIN: 0.0556 0.0278 0.0428 0.8779 0.8910 0.8849
VAR: 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 2.10: C1 & C2 Results for Random Sampling Procedure (trimmed)
Sample N C1E C
1
CF C
1 p-value C2E C
2
CF C
2 p-value
1 250 0.1111 0.1357 0.1234 0.0000 *** 0.7793 0.7584 0.7688 0.0000 ***
2 250 0.1151 0.1656 0.1404 0.0000 *** 0.7904 0.7658 0.7781 0.0000 ***
3 250 0.1574 0.1946 0.1760 0.0000 *** 0.7749 0.7438 0.7593 0.0000 ***
4 250 0.1352 0.1686 0.1519 0.0000 *** 0.7927 0.7699 0.7813 0.0000 ***
5 250 0.1185 0.1546 0.1365 0.0000 *** 0.7890 0.7584 0.7737 0.0000 ***
6 250 0.1435 0.1749 0.1592 0.0000 *** 0.7917 0.7690 0.7803 0.0000 ***
7 250 0.1524 0.1753 0.1638 0.0000 *** 0.7913 0.7694 0.7803 0.0000 ***
8 250 0.1489 0.1641 0.1565 0.0000 *** 0.7816 0.7618 0.7717 0.0000 ***
9 250 0.1275 0.1860 0.1568 0.0000 *** 0.7880 0.7596 0.7738 0.0000 ***
10 250 0.1651 0.1635 0.1643 0.0000 *** 0.7835 0.7560 0.7697 0.0000 ***
MEAN: 0.1375 0.1683 0.1529 0.7862 0.7612 0.7737
MEDIAN: 0.1394 0.1671 0.1566 0.7885 0.7607 0.7738
MAX: 0.1651 0.1946 0.1760 0.7927 0.7699 0.7813
MIN: 0.1111 0.1357 0.1234 0.7749 0.7438 0.7593
VAR: 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
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The results from the random sampling procedure in Tables 2.7–2.10 show that even
a random sample of firms over the sample time period 1999–2010 displays closeness
statistically significantly different than zero. As discussed earlier, the measures do not
control for similarity in economic events. To the extent that economic events common
to a randomly chosen group of firms have a positive effect on similarity that outweighs
the negative effect on similarity of those firm–specific economic events, the measures will
be biased upward. Thus, observing closeness measures statistically significantly different
than zero for the random samples implies that these firms must be exposed to a set of
common economic events (i.e. they all are subject to U.S. macroeconomic conditions)
which is biasing the measures upward, away from zero (or downward, away from 1 in
the case of measure two).
Also, as expected, 250–firm random samples from the trimmed original sample dis-
play larger closeness than random samples from the untrimmed sample. More specifically
however comparing Tables 6 and 10 shows that average SIC industry closeness (0.0918)
is higher than mean closeness (0.0394) from 10 random samples of firms chosen from the
entire sample of firms representing all industries. This can also be seen when compar-
ing Tables 9 and 12 as mean industry closeness of the SIC using realized fundamentals
(0.1629) is higher than mean closeness of the 10 random samples (0.0913). These dif-
ferences between mean industry closeness and mean random sample closeness are all
statistically significant at the 1% level. These results hold for closeness measure two
as well and also hold when comparing the GIC scheme closeness to the random sample
closeness. Taken as a whole, it seems that the SIC and GIC industrial classification
schemes do group firms whose fundamentals move together over time to a greater ex-
tent than a random grouping of the firms. I would expect this ex ante and thus some
validation of the closeness measures is provided.
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2.2.5 Interpretation of Results
Combining the results for the untrimmed and trimmed samples using both unex-
pected and realized earnings and net operating cash flows seems to suggest that both
schemes place firms into groups whose fundamentals have low correlation over time. That
is, a group of firms’ primary generating business activities being similar is not a sufficient
condition for their fundamentals to be very correlated over time. Often researchers will
control for firm–group similarity (or industry) by using an industrial classification scheme
such as the SIC or GIC. The results above imply that this exercise, at best, simply con-
trols for firm–group similarity in primary revenue generating activity and thus exposure
to similar demand and supply–side markets. However, it doesn’t seem that using one
of these schemes controls for similarity in the outcomes (realized and unexpected fun-
damental firm–performance measures) resulting from being exposed to similar demand
and supply–side markets. Researchers should take this into consideration when using
these schemes to group “comparable” firms and should not make the assumption that
the underlying fundamentals of a given group of firms move similarly simply because a
scheme classifies the group as an “industry”.
Copyright © Jonathan Freeman Ross 2012
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Chapter 3: Accounting Closeness and Information Transfer
3.1 Trading on Information Contained in the Measures
A logical question begs to be asked at this point. Can we trade on information
contained in the measures and earn a return above and beyond what we would expect to
earn ex ante? It would seem reasonable that we could. Consider the following strategy.
First, identify two groups of firms; one (Group A) in which closeness (as measured by C1
and C2) is zero and the other (Group B) in which closeness is statistically significantly
greater than zero. Next, observe the earnings announcement (t = 0) of the leading firm
in each portfolio . Suppose that the leaders in both portfolios announce good news. Buy
one share of stock in each of the other firms (non–leader firms) in each of the portfolios,
hold for a short period of time (i.e. 1-5 days) and then sell. The abnormal return
of group B should be greater than the abnormal return of group A. Furthermore, the
abnormal return of group B should be statistically significantly greater than zero while
the abnormal return of group A should not be statistically significantly greater than zero.
The reasoning is as follows. Since portfolio B firms are close, when the leader announces
good news, we can expect that, on average61, the non–leader firms will also subsequently
announce good news. At t = 0, unless the price of these other firms already incorporates
this “closeness” information, the other firms are undervalued and we therefore can buy
low and expect to sell high. For portfolio A, when the leader announces good news at
t = 0 we have no expectation regarding the earnings announcement of the other firms
in the portfolio. Since portfolio A has historically zero closeness, we can expect that
the effect of the subsequent good news announcers will be offset by the effect of the
subsequent bad news announcers. Thus, buying one share of stock in portfolio A firms
and selling after 1-5 days should not lead to earning a higher return than expected. Some
of these firms are undervalued while some are overvalued at t = 0 so buying one share in
each will only lead to earning a return lower than expected on some and a return higher
61Unless analysts are overly optimistic for the non–leader subsequent earnings announcers.
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than expected on some with the expected effect being zero unexpected return.
There are two implicit assumptions that must hold if the proposed strategy above
is to work. First, markets are assumed to be inefficient; inefficient in the sense that
the price discovery process of a firm subsequent to public information releases is not
instantaneous but persists over a short–window (i.e. 1–3 days). Any trading strategy
that is a function of publicly available information must start with the assumption of
market inefficiency (Otherwise why would a trading strategy be developed?). If markets
are efficient then the prices of the non–leader portfolio B firms at t = 0 will already
incorporate the historical closeness information and thus these firms will already be
correctly valued at t = 0. Buying a share of each of these firms and selling at a later
date should not earn a return higher than expected.
Second, I am assuming zero transaction costs62. This assumption is, of course, not
completely descriptive of the current trading environment; especially when trading with
small balances (i.e. < $100, 000). Since the strategy requires making multiple trades,
typical individual investors using online brokerage systems (e.g. Scottrade, Ameritrade)
will pay a fee of around $8 per trade. For example, if one invests $10, 000 in Portfolio B
which consists of 30 companies, then they will pay an $8 fee for each company (regardless
of the amount of shares bought) both for buying and then for selling a few day(s) later.
Thus their fee would be $8 ∗ 30 ∗ 2 = $480. Therefore, in total, the prices of the stocks
would need to rise by at least 4.8% over the short–window in order for the individual
to break even. If the individual invested $100, 000 instead in Portfolio B, the fee would
still be $480. In this situation however, stock price appreciation need only be 0.48% in
order for the individual to break even.
In addition to reasoning theoretically, there does exist research whose findings would
lend credence to the feasibility of the proposed strategy. Gleason et al. 2008 find that
when firms announce bad news at t = 0 (in the form of earnings restatements) they
experience an abnormal return of, on average, −19.8% over t = (−1, 1). Over the
same window, other “peer” firms in the same industry experience abnormal returns, on
62I also ignore the tax implications of such a strategy.
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average, of about −0.5% ceteris paribus and this is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Thus, they find evidence of a contagion effect; the effect of bad news announced
by one firm in an industry spills over to the rest of the firms in the form of share price
declines.
I believe the very small “contagion” effect documented in Gleason et al. 2008 is due
to the assumption that closeness is constant across industries when in fact it isn’t. Their
effect, I believe, would increase with the closeness (as measured by C1 and C2) of the
industry in question. In their sample, they have industries with zero closeness and in-
dustries with closeness statistically significantly greater than zero lumped together. The
effect they find would not be hypothesized for those zero–closeness industries but would
be expected for those industries with closeness greater than zero. The net contagion
effect was −0.005. Thus, on average, industry closeness must have been statistically
greater than zero. This is consistent with the SIC & GIC results I presented earlier in
Chapter 2.
Gleason et al. 2008 was not the first paper to examine information transfer. Other
papers in this area related to accounting restatements include Foster 1981, Clinch and
Sinclair 1987, Pownall and Waymire 1989, Han and Wild 1990, Freeman and Tse 1992,
Ramnath 2002 and Palmrose et al. 2004. Information transfer papers related to63 re-
tailers monthly sales reports, bank loan–loss reserves, bank failures, bankruptcy filings,
dividend initiations, internet hacker attacks and nuclear accidents have also been pub-
lished as well.
3.2 Methodology and Results
To implement the above trading strategy I searched Table 2.4 for the industries which
ranked highest and lowest on closeness measure one as a function of earnings and cash
flows. To provide the best chance to earn statistically significantly greater abnormal
returns on one portfolio versus another I should choose two portfolios which have a large
63See, Docking et al. 1997, Aharony and Swary 1983, Bowen et al. 1983, Olssen and Dietrich 1985,
Lang and Stulz 1992, Firth 1996, Ferris et al. 1997 and Ettredge and Richardson 2003.
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difference in closeness. My decision rule was to find the pair of industries with the highest
closeness and lowest closeness respectively subject to the constraint that the leaders of
each of the portfolios had to announce good news for 201064. I used Compustat to sort a
particular industry–portfolio by the date they announced their earnings for 2010. For a
given portfolio, the firm which announced 4th quarter earnings for 2010 first and whose
assets were in the top 5% of the portfolio was identified as the “leader”. I removed
firms which did not have 12/31 fiscal year ends, firms which announced earnings within
3 days of the leader and firms which did not have return information for each day in
the window (-2,+3) around the leaders earnings announcement date in CRSP. I defined
good news as happening when EPS for 2010 was higher than median analyst forecasted
EPS. I used IBES to determine this. Since the industries with the highest and lowest
closeness respectively both had leaders which announced bad news for 2010 I moved to
the next highest and lowest industries respectively. These also suffered from the same
problem and thus one more iteration was needed before I identified a “close” industry
and “not close” industry whose leaders announced good news respectively. Thus my two
industry–portfolios have the 3rd highest and 3rd lowest closeness respectively from Table
2.5. These industries were SIC 28—Chemicals and Allied Products and SIC 80—Health
Services (henceforth “portfolio A” and “portfolio B” respectively). Portfolio A initially
consisted of 328 firms and {C1, C2} = {0.0240, 0.8285} while portfolio B consisted of 50
firms and {C1, C2} = {0.2840, 0.7220}. I then reduced the sample using the procedure
described above and summarized in the following table65.
64There is no reason to believe that an analogous short–selling strategy wouldn’t work if the leader
announced bad news
65See legend in Appendix E for description of super scripts in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Portfolio Sample Selection/Closeness
Portfolio A Portfolio B
N beg.(a) 328 50
C1 beg.(b) 0.0240 0.2840
C2 beg.(c) 0.8285 0.7220
non 12/31 FY end(d) 71 6
earnings announced (0,+3)(e) 12 0
Missing CRSP data (f) 74 0
Leader(g) 1 1
Leader announcement date(h) 1/20/2011 1/25/2011
N final(i) 170 43
C1 final(j) 0.0144 0.2922
C2 final(k) 0.8186 0.7043
The closeness of the final portfolio A sample of 0.0144 is not statistically significantly
different than zero. The closeness of the final portfolio B sample of 0.2922 is strongly
statistically different than zero and the difference in closeness between the portfolios
(0.2922 - 0.0144) is strongly statistically significantly different than zero (p − value <
0.01). Thus I have two portfolios which are different in terms of closeness. Portfolio
A’s firms are not close, in the sense that knowing information regarding the earnings
and/or cash flows of any one (e.g. the leader) of the firms in portfolio A at time t = 0
gives no information aiding in the prediction of the other firms earnings and cash flows.
Portfolio B’s firms are somewhat close. Using the Table 1.1 interpretation, Portfolio B
firms have small closeness as C1 = 0.2922 falls in the interval [0.1, 0.3) and C2 = 0.7043
falls in the interval [0.6, 0.85). Thus knowing information regarding the earnings and/or
cash flows of any one of the Portfolio B firms gives some information aiding in the
prediction of the other firms earnings and cash flows. Specifically, knowing that the
leader in Portfolio B announces good news tells us that the other firms in Portfolio B
will, on average, announce good news as well. By, “on average”, I don’t necessarily
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mean that the number of non–leader firms which announce good news will necessarily
be greater than the number of non–leader firms which announce bad news but that the
total magnitude of the good news announcers will exceed the total magnitude of the
bad news announcers in terms of the absolute difference between actual earnings and
expected earnings. This is all assuming that this historical closeness will persist into the
future.
The next step was to determine the windows over which I should measure abnormal
returns. I decided on 5 different windows which the prior literature suggests. In case of
anticipation of the market regarding the direction of the leaders’ earnings announcement
I include two windows which capture the market reaction before the date of the leaders’
earnings announcement ([−2,+2], [−1,+1]). The other three windows I analyze the
market reaction around are ([0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3]). The windows which include days
before t = 0, for the purposes of my trading strategy, are infeasible. An investor who
knows that Portfolio B’s firms are somewhat close will not be able to predict when the
leader will announce earnings and thus will not be able to buy shares of stock in the non–
leaders until t = 0. I analyze these other windows though following the prior information
transfer literature.
Since I desired the abnormal or unexpected return around t = 0 for the non–leader
firms I needed some measure of expected returns. Once obtained, the difference between
actual and expected returns would proxy for the unexpected market reaction over these
event windows. The return one can expect to earn on a security depends on the risk of
the security ceteris paribus. This risk can be broken down into two parts; systematic
and unsystematic. The systematic portion of this risk is commonly proxied for by beta.
Beta tells us how the return for security i moves as a function of the overall market
return. Betas greater than one imply that, for a one–percent increase(decrease) in the
market return, the return on security i also increases(decreases) by one–percent. Thus,
betas greater than one represent more risky stocks. Betas less than one but greater than
zero imply that, for a one percent increase(decrease) in the market return, the return
on security i increases(decreases) by less than one–percent. These are the safe stocks
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from a risk averse individual’s point of view. Finally, betas less than one imply that the
return on security i moves opposite that of the market return66.
The unsystematic portion of risk is usually proxied for by the variance in historical
stock returns. I will not attempt to measure this part of the risk as I have no reason to
believe that this part would be different, on average, for portfolio A versus portfolio B.
However, I do have reason to believe that the systematic portion of this risk would be
different.
Portfolio A firms represent SIC industry 28—Chemicals and Allied Products. Port-
folio B firms represent SIC industry 80—Health Services. Take for example, Quest Di-
agnostics, one of the leaders in the Health Services industry. According to their website,
they are the world’s leading provider of diagnostic testing services for hospitals. They
provide tests ranging from routine blood tests, to complex, gene–based, molecular test-
ing. They also are a leading provider of instruments used in these diagnostic tests. They
develop and manufacture devices, test kits and reagents used by physicians, hospitals,
blood collection centers and other clinical laboratories to help detect, characterize, mon-
itor and select treatment for disease. Based on the description, I am strongly inclined to
believe that the price–elasticity of demand for Quests’ products and services (as well as
the other firms in the Health Services industry) is close to zero. That is, the sensitivity
of demand to changes in the prices of the products and services provided by the Health
Services industry is likely low. After all, if your physician says you need a special gene
test to decide whether or not you have a certain type of cancer, your demand for this
test won’t change much if the test costs $1 or $1, 000. My point is, that the firms in
the Health Services industry are safer investments from an investors point of view (e.g.
lower betas) since the demand for these firms products and services is relatively inelastic
with respect to the prices they charge. An educated guess would be that portfolio B
firms would experience increases/decreases in returns less extreme than the market (i.e.
have betas less than one).
66Negative beta stocks are relatively uncommon.
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The demand for the products and services provided by SIC 28—Chemicals and Allied
Products firms is likely much more responsive to changes in the prices these firms charge.
PPG Industries Inc., one of the leaders in this industry, is the world’s leading supplier
of sealants, coatings, maintenance chemicals, transparencies and application systems
for airplanes, automobiles and ships. If PPG decides to raise its price for one of their
sealants, the change in demand would likely be greater than Quest raising the price of a
diagnostic test which would determine whether you had cancer or not. Since the price
elasticity of demand for the products and services provided by firms in portfolio A is
likely higher than for portfolio B, I would expect that portfolio A firms are more risky
investments ceteris paribusOf course there may be other reasons to believe this as well..
Based on the preceding discussion, the next step was to determine the betas for each
of the firms in portfolio A and B. Following prior literature (e.g. Chaney & Philipich
2002) I calculated beta as the coefficient on the market return from the following OLS
regression model.
Rid = αi + βiRmd + εid (23)
Return data for the above regression was obtained from CRSP. I used holding period
daily returns from the first trading day of 1999 through the last trading day of 2010.
Many studies calculate beta using the regression above but only with daily returns for
the previous 250 trading days leading up to the event window of interest. The reason I
use 1999–2010 is because the closeness measures were calculated over this time period
and I wanted to remain consistent in this respect. For the daily market return, I used
the value–weighted NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX return.
Upon completion of the above procedure I had a vector of 170 betas for the portfolio
A firms and 43 betas for portfolio B firms. The mean(median) beta for portfolio A was
0.5749(0.5327) and for portfolio B it was 0.3263(0.3072). This is consistent with my
reasoning earlier that portfolio B firms should be less risky than portfolio A firms due
to a lower price– elasticity of demand for their products.
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The next step was to calculate the abnormal return for each security in each portfolio
around each of the 5 event windows W = [w1, w2, w3, w4, w5] where wi is one of the five
event windows discussed previously. So, for example, over the window w1 = [−2,+2]
the following formula was used to calculate the abnormal return for security i over event
window w1.
ARiw1 =
(
+2∏
d=−2
(1 +Rid)− 1
)
−
(
α̂i + β̂i ∗
(
+2∏
d=−2
(1 +Rmd)− 1
))
(24)
The first part of (24) represents the actual compound return for security i over window
w1 and the second part represents the expected compound return for security i over
window w1 using the alpha and beta obtained from the historical regression in (23).
Table 3.2 below summarizes the results67 from implementing the trading strategy
described above without controlling for the difference in systematic risk (beta) between
the portfolios.
Table 3.2: Event Window Mean Abnormal Returns
Window Portfolio A Portfolio B Portfolio B - Portfolio A
[−1,+1] -0.0346*** 0.0191*** 0.0537***
[−2,+2] -0.0266*** 0.0172*** 0.0438***
[0,+1] -0.0164*** 0.0154*** 0.0318***
[0,+2] -0.0112*** 0.0203*** 0.0314***
[0,+3] -0.0124*** 0.0069* 0.0194***
Table 3.2 provides evidence that one will earn a return less than expected, on av-
erage, by implementing the trading strategy described earlier with portfolio A but will
earn a return higher than expected, on average, with portfolio B. Thus, one can enjoy
statistically significantly greater unexpected returns on portfolio B firms than on port-
folio A firms (column 4) over all these windows. This analysis is without controlling for
beta however. Since portfolio B firms are of lower risk (have a lower average beta), the
67The results were robust to using medians instead of means.
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expected return for portfolio B firms will be less than those of portfolio A. Thus the
abnormal returns for portfolio B firms should be higher than for portfolio A firms ceteris
paribus. This biases in favor of the result. Consequently I control for beta and test to
see if the Table 3.2 results persist. To control for differences in beta, I recalculated the
event window abnormal returns for portfolio B firms using the mean portfolio A beta in
equation (24) instead of β̂i. Table 3.3 reports the results from this procedure.
Table 3.3: Mean Abnormal Returns Controlling for Beta
Window Portfolio A Portfolio B Portfolio B - Portfolio A
[−1,+1] -0.0346*** 0.0168*** 0.0514***
[−2,+2] -0.0266*** 0.0142** 0.0408***
[0,+1] -0.0164*** 0.0144*** 0.0308***
[0,+2] -0.0112*** 0.0188*** 0.0300***
[0,+3] -0.0124*** 0.0091** 0.0215***
As expected, mean event window abnormal returns for portfolio B decreased when
abnormal returns for portfolio B were calculated using the mean portfolio A beta in
equation (24) instead of firm–specific historical betas. However, the Table 3.2 results
are still present. Specifically, adopting the trading strategy proposed earlier leads to one
earning a statistically significantly negative abnormal return on portfolio A firms and
a statistically significantly positive abnormal return on portfolio B firms. Furthermore,
one can earn a statistically significantly higher abnormal return on portfolio B (“close”)
firms than portfolio A (not “close”) firms.
I repeated the strategy above for eight other industry portfolios. These results along
with a summary of all the results both for abnormal returns and actual returns are
presented in Table F.1 in Appendix F. Table E.1 in Appendix E contains a summary of
the portfolio sample selection for each of the 10 portfolios tested.
The trading strategy results summarized in Tables 21 & 22 provide consistent evi-
dence with the strategy described earlier in this Chapter. For example, when leaders
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announce good news and closeness is reasonably high (i.e. SIC Portfolios 29, 44, 63 and
80 from Table E.1 in Appendix E), abnormal and actual returns are statistically signifi-
cantly positive over all three realistic trading windows [0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3] (see Table
F.1 in Appendix F). Also, when leaders announce bad news and closeness is reasonably
high (i.e. SIC Portfolio 45), abnormal and actual returns are strongly statistically sig-
nificantly negative over these same windows. Furthermore, when leaders announce good
news but closeness is not statistically significantly different than zero (i.e. SIC Portfolios
10, 28 and 39), abnormal and actual returns are either not statistically different than
zero or statistically significantly less than zero over these three windows. In addition,
when leaders announce good news, closeness is reasonably high, the median beta of the
group is high (i.e. SIC Portfolio 15), and the market performs poorly over each of these
three windows then abnormal and actual returns are strongly statistically significantly
less than zero68. Finally, when leaders announce neutral news and closeness is reasonably
high (i.e. SIC Portfolio 20), abnormal and actual returns are not statistically different
from zero over each of these three windows.
These results imply that the return earned over a specific window, as a result of
implementing the trading strategy described, is a function of the closeness of the group,
the level and magnitude of news that the leader announces and the market return. This
function appears to be somewhat linear from the results that were found. However the
SIC industry–portfolio 15 results are one reason to believe this function may not be
linear because this group had relatively high closeness (C1 = 0.5437) and announced
good news (1% higher than expected) but experienced negative returns over all three
windows because the market return was negative over two of these windows and the
median beta of the group was high (β = 2.1180). However, for nine of the ten SIC–
industry portfolios tested, the median beta was less than one and since the function
appears to be somewhat linear from the results found for these nine the return results
from all three realistic trading windows ([0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3]) were combined into 27
68Providing evidence that the mean portfolio return is more sensitive to the market reaction than to
the closeness of the portfolio when beta is “high”.
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observations for these SIC industry–portfolios and the following OLS regression was
calculated to examine the relationship described above.
RETi,w = γ1 + γ2C
1
i + γ3%Newsi + γ4C
1
i ∗%Newsi + γ5MRw + εi,w (25)
where RETi,w is the mean actual or mean abnormal return earned over window w for SIC
industry–portfolio i, C1 is the historical closeness of portfolio i, %Newsi is the percentage
deviation of 2010 actual earnings per share from the median consensus analyst forecast
(from IBIS and shown in Table E.1 in Appendix E) for the leader of portfolio i and MRw
is the market return over window w. The interaction of C1 with %News is necessary
since returns move in opposite directions depending on the direction of the news and this
effect is hypothesized to be increasing in the closeness of the firm–group whose leader
announces such news.
Results are presented below in Table 3.4 both when the dependent variable is actual
returns and abnormal returns (column i represents the i’th coefficient from equation
(25)).
Table 3.4: Return Regression Results
Reti,w i γi t− stati p− valuei R2(Adj R2)
A
ct
u
a
l
1 -0.0015 -0.1672 0.8687
2 -0.0284 -0.6835 0.5014
3 -0.1870 -1.1462 0.2640 0.7705(0.7287)
4 3.1129 3.5764 0.0017
5 1.0605 2.4811 0.0212
A
b
n
o
rm
a
l
1 -0.0023 -0.2497 0.8052
2 -0.0427 -0.9883 0.3337
3 -0.5376 -3.1709 0.0044 0.7516(0.7065)
4 3.7432 4.1391 0.0000
5 0.9378 2.1117 0.0463
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Table 3.4 provides strong evidence that closeness interacts with the leaders’ news
announcement to exacerbate firm–group short window actual and abnormal returns.
The strongly statistically significant γ4 indicates that the short–window portfolio return
is increasing in the earnings surprise announced by the leader at t = 0. Furthermore,
this effect is increasing in the closeness of the group. Specifically from Table 3.4, a
one–percent increase in %News leads to a (3.1129 ∗C1− 0.1870) percent increase in the
short window portfolio actual return. Thus since 3.1129 ∗ C1 − 0.1870 is a statistically
significantly increasing function of C1 one can correctly interpret that closeness interacts
with the news announcement to exacerbate the contagion effect. Interestingly, when
C1 . 0.06 the coefficient on %News is negative and no contagion effect is observed on
average. This result helps to specify a lower bound on how close a firm–group must
be before a contagion effect from a news announcement is observed. Finally, both the
actual and abnormal return are strongly positively statistically significantly correlated
with the market reaction over window w as expected. Finally, the independent variables
in the model explain over 70% of the variation in the short window returns; with the IV’s
explaining more variation in actual returns (73%) than in unexpected returns (70%).
A couple of things should be noted however regarding the equation (25) analysis.
First, the sample size is rather small (i.e. n = 27) and thus the sampling distribution of
the each of the coefficients is not guaranteed to be normal (hence the use of the t–tests).
As a result, t− stati and p− valuei may be somewhat noisy approximations of the true
relationship between the IV’s and DV’s given. Second, OLS regression assumes a linear
relationship between the dependent variable and the coefficients. To the extent that the
data is non–linear, OLS regression lines will not precisely describe the relationship being
analyzed.
Overall, the results suggest that returns to the trading strategy described above are
higher for those closer portfolios versus those portfolios exhibiting historically low close-
ness. That is, in historically “close” industries, when leaders announce good news, the
strategy generates statistically significantly positive (and higher) abnormal and actual
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returns69 than in industries exhibiting zero–to–low historical closeness. Also I find evi-
dence that when leaders in “close” industries announce bad news, the strategy generates
statistically significantly negative abnormal and actual returns. The negative contagion
effect of leaders announcing bad news seems to be greater than the positive one when
leaders announce good news (See SIC industry–portfolio 45 results). Results also suggest
however that one should pay careful attention to the average beta of the portfolio. Close
firm portfolios whose leaders announce good news might not generate positive returns
if the included companies have high betas (β > 1) and the market performs poorly over
one or more trading window days. The contagion effect of the good news leader earnings
announcement is offset by the extra sensitive reaction to the market for firms with high
betas70. Thus, closeness should be the first screening criteria for determining the port-
folio of choice, followed by an assessment of the firm betas. High average portfolio firm
betas pose a much greater risk to investors since a small negative move for the market
will be amplified for these firms. High closeness portfolios with average betas less than
one are ideal. Positive contagion effects from leaders’ good news earnings announce-
ments in “close” industries tend to offset a negative market move when the firms have
low betas since the firm–specific returns are not affected as much (See the results SIC
industry–portfolios 29, 44 and 80) . Of course, positive market moves exacerbate these
positive contagion effects for firms with betas greater than zero.
3.3 Discussion
These results have interesting implications. First, we see that, at time t = 0 the
market underprices portfolio B firms and a simple strategy of buying low and selling
high earns a return higher than expected for these firms. This is in direct contrast to the
semi–strong efficient markets hypothesis which predicts that, at time t = 0, all publicly
available information will be captured in the price of a firm thus leaving no opportunity
69This fact provides evidence that the expected returns model I used in equations (23) and (24) is a
reasonable description of returns. If this wasn’t true then abnormal returns wouldn’t necessarily be
in a consistent direction with actual returns.
70See the results for SIC industry portfolio 15 in Appendices E & F.
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to buy low and sell higher than expected.
Second, the contagion effect of firm information announcements is present subsequent
to “good news” announcements. Previous literature has focused more on “bad news”
announcements (e.g. earnings restatements, bankruptcy filings, internet hacker attacks,
nuclear disasters etc.).
Third, this contagion effect is not independent of the fundamental accounting “close-
ness” of the announcing leader firms’ group. Specifically, we could have hypothesized,
from Gleason et al. 2008, that portfolio A firms would also see statistically significantly
positive abnormal returns since the leader announced good news and the firms belong
to the same industry. The reasoning would have been71 that the leaders’ good news
earnings announcement is an indication of the overall prospects for the industry and a
contagion effect should be observed whereby the other non–announcing “peer” firms in
the industry experience share price increases at time t = 0. The evidence in Table 3.2
however, provides evidence against this hypothesis. In fact, the market reaction to the
leaders’ good news earnings announcement is negative for those non–announcing peer
firms over all 5 windows!
3.4 Conclusion
Closeness in an accounting information sense cannot be universally defined since any
definition depends on which elements in the set of accounting information one wants to
base closeness on and who the users are. In this study I have defined closeness between
a group of firms as the correlation in their ex post financial statement information.
In Chapter 1 I introduced two measures that I believe to be good proxies for closeness
as defined in the study. The first measure is the equally–weighted average correlation
in abnormal earnings and cash flows between each pair of firms in a group. The second
measure is the equally–weighted average determinant of the abnormal earnings and cash
flow correlation matrices between each pair of firms in a group. Through simulation I
71Following the reasoning in Gleason et al. 2008.
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have shown that both measures do a good job of capturing closeness since groups of firms
one would expect ex ante to not be as close rank lower on the closeness measures than
those firms one would expect ex ante to be closer. That is, I find that the measures of
firm–group closeness are decreasing in the variability (i.e. randomness) of the earnings
process for that particular group of firms. Additionally, C2 is more sensitive than C1
to changes in the randomness of a firms’ earnings process. Finally, I find that both
measures seem to coincide with each other well. That is, both measures agree most of
the time on the magnitude of closeness between a group of firms.
In Chapter 2 I used the measures to evaluate the two most widely used industrial
classification schemes in regards to their ability to group firms whose fundamentals move
together over time. Evidence shows that both the SIC and GIC schemes do a decent to
poor job of grouping firms whose fundamentals co–vary over time. Researchers should
take this into consideration when using these schemes to group “comparable” firms.
Industrial classifications group firms with similar primary revenue generating business
activities. This methodology however does not always translate into firm–groups whose
fundamentals move similarly over time. Prior research has shown that the industrial
classification schemes do a relatively good job at grouping firms whose share prices move
similarly. This should imply that these schemes also group firms whose unexpected
fundamentals move similarly assuming that firm value is equal to discounted unexpected
fundamentals. Results in this study imply that this assumption should be tempered to
allow for investor bias and/or noise to enter into the firm value formula. This is consistent
with Lee (2001) who argues that firm value is a function of discounted unexpected
fundamentals and investor bias and/or noise.
Finally, in this chapter, I use information contained in the measures to develop a
simple trading strategy which generates statistically significant abnormal returns. I also
provide evidence that within–industry contagion effects to firm information announce-
ments are increasing with the closeness of that particular industry.
Copyright © Jonathan Freeman Ross 2012
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Appendix A: Transitivity of Correlation
Here I will prove the following Theorem stated in section 1.5.2. The proof is similar to
Langford et al. (2001).
Theorem. Suppose that X, Y and Z are random variables and that X and Y , and
Y and Z are positively correlated with correlations rX,Y and rY,Z respectively. Suppose
further that r2X,Y + r
2
Y,Z > 1. Then X and Z are positively correlated.
Proof. I will first assume that the random variables X, Y and Z each assume only finitely
many distinct values. Formally, X, Y and Z are functions defined on the following
set Ω = {a1, a2, a3, . . . , an}. Now X can be identified with a vector in n–dimensional
Euclidean space via the correspondence
X ↔ X = (X(a1), X(a2), . . . , X(an))
and similarly for Y and Z. If one assumes that the set Ω is equipped with a uniform
probability measure72 then the correlations of X, Y and Z will be captured in the
geometric properties of the corresponding vectors X, Y and Z. I will further assume
that E(X) = E(Y ) = E(Z) = 0. I can do this without loss of generality since variances
and covariances (and hence correlations) are translation invariant. That is the correlation
between two vectors will not change if the two vectors are shifted by a constant. From
vector analysis one may recall that the dot product of two vectors, X and Y, in n–
dimensional Euclidean space is given by the formula X · Y = |X||Y|cos(θXY ), where
θXY is the angle between X and Y and cos represents the cosine function. Since X ·Y =
N∑
i=1
xiyi and |X| =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
x2i then . . .
72As is the case when we are dealing with “data”.
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cos(θXY ) =
X ·Y
|X||Y|
=
N∑
i=1
xiyi√√√√ N∑
i=1
x2i ∗
√√√√ N∑
i=1
y2i
= rX,Y
and thus rX,Y is just the cosine of the angle θXY between the vectors X and Y. Although
I am in n–dimensional space, since there are three vectors, I can restrict my focus to
only the 3–dimensional subspace spanned by the vectors X, Y and Z and I can thus
use a geometric argument to prove the theorem. Now, given the domain of the cosine
function below (in degrees) . . .
cos(θXY ) =

(0, 1] for 0 ≤ θXY < 90◦
0 for θXY = 90
◦
[−1, 0) for 90◦ < θXY < 180◦
one can see that two random variables will have positive correlation if the angle between
their corresponding vectors is acute, negative if the angle is obtuse and zero if their
corresponding vectors are perpendicular (i.e. form a right angle). If the angle is zero
then the two variables have correlation 1 and if the angle is 180 degrees the two variables
have correlation -1.
Now, referring to Figure 3, it is known from geometry that the angle between X and Z
(i.e. ∠XOZ) is less than or equal to the sum of the angle between X and Y (∠XOY )
and the angle between Y and Z (∠Y OZ). Since these angles are given by cos−1(rX,Z),
cos−1(rX,Y ) and cos
−1(rY,Z) respectively, and since cos
−1(rX,Y ) and cos
−1(rY,Z) are acute
because rX,Y and rY,Z are positive, it follows that rX,Z will be positive whenever . . .
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Figure A.1: Three Vectors in Three Dimensional Space
cos
(
cos−1(rX,Y ) + cos
−1(rY,Z)
)
> 0
Expanding the left–hand side out by the addition formula for the cosine function, we see
that this is equivalent to . . .
cos
(
cos−1(rX,Y )
)
cos
(
cos−1(rY,Z)
)
− sin
(
cos−1(rX,Y )
)
sin
(
cos−1(rY,Z)
)
> 0
rX,Y rY,Z −
√
(1− r2X,Y )(1− r2Y,Z) > 0
Rearranging, squaring both sides and then simplifying yields the equivalent condition
r2X,Y + r
2
Y,Z > 1
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Appendix B: Alternative Weighting Scheme for C1 and C2
Although I initially assign equal weights to earnings and cash flows in C1 and C2 it
should be pointed out that earnings tend to smooth cash flows and thus have a smaller
variance over time than cash flows. During periods where this is the case for each firm,
the pair–wise earnings across firms should be correlated more than pair–wise cash flows.
Thus, assigning equal weights to C1E and C
1
CF (C
2
E and C
2
CF ) will only bias C
1 (C2)
downward. Therefore, as a robustness test, closeness measures were calculated for the
industries using an alternative weighting scheme described below73.
First, the standard deviation of earnings (σe and σcf ) and cash flows was calculated
within–industry for the sample time period (1999–2010). Then the following system of
equations was solved to obtain the weights placed on C1E (C
2
E) and C
1
CF (C
2
CF ).
α + β = 1 (1)
α
α + β
= 1− σE
σE + σCF
when σE < σCF (2)
Equation (1) tells us that the weight assigned to earnings (α) plus the weight assigned to
cash flows (β) should equal one. Equation (2) tells us that ratio of the weight assigned
to earnings to the sum of the weights should equal to one less the ratio of the standard
deviation of earnings to the sum of the standard deviations of earnings and cash flows.
The latter ratio represents the relative percent of the total standard deviation of earnings
and cash flows that can be attributed to earnings. The former ratio represents the
relative percent of the total weights that can be attributed to earnings. It makes sense
to choose the weights in a manner consistent with the relative variances of earnings and
cash flows. The more inherent volatility in the ex post summary performance measure,
the less weight that should be placed on it when measuring closeness across firms over
time. When cash flows have lower variance than earnings Equation (2) would be of the
following form...
73See Appendix D for a concise summary of the results. Notice that the results are rather similar using
the alternative weighting scheme rather than equally weighting earnings and cash flows.
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β
α + β
= 1− σCF
σE + σCF
when σCF < σE (3)
Solving the pair of equations gives the following . . .
α =

σCF
σE+σCF
for σE < σCF
σE
σE+σCF
for σCF < σE
β = 1− α
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Appendix C: The Determinant of the Correlation Matrix
To visualize C2, first note that C2 is a function of |CORRX(i, j)| where X is a random
variable whose mean and variance exist and are finite74. CORRX(i, j) is a two by two
matrix whose (i, j)’th entry is the sample Pearson Product moment correlation between
Xi and Xj where (i, j) represents a firm–pair as seen below.
CORRX(i, j) =
rii rij
rji rjj

We can then form a parallelogram with the two row vectors of CORRX(i, j) as shown
below . . .
Figure C.1: Parallelogram formed from row vectors of correlation matrix
Above, we see that row one of CORRX(i, j) is given by vector
−−→
P2P1 = (rii, rij). Row two
of CORRX(i, j) is given by vector
−−→
P2P3 = (rji, rjj). We then use these vectors to form
74Recall that X is either earnings, unexpected earnings, cash flows or unexpected cash flows in this
study.
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parallelogram P1P2P3P4
75. It turns out that the determinant of CORRX(i, j) gives the
area (“volume” in dimensions higher than two) of this parallelogram. The closer the
area is to zero, the smaller the angle formed by the two vectors and thus the closer the
vectors are to each other. When the determinant is zero, the parallelogram has zero area
and thus the row vectors lie on top of each other and are perfectly correlated. Keep in
mind that the row vectors are the correlation of each firm both with itself and with the
other firm over time. Thus, the closer the vectors are to being superimposed on each
other, the closer the firms are to each other in terms of their outputs moving similarly
over time.
A generalization of the following theorem was stated for all n–dimensional matrices in
section 1.4.2 but will be proven for the special two–dimensional correlation matrix case.
Theorem. The determinant of a 2× 2 correlation matrix CORRX(i, j) is equal to the
area of the parallelogram formed by the row vectors of CORRX(i, j).
Proof. First note that, by definition, det(CORRX(i, j)) = |CORRX(i, j)| = rii ∗ rjj −
rij ∗ rji. We know however, from the properties of the Pearson Product moment cor-
relation, that rii = rjj = 1 and that rij = rji. That is, a random variable is perfectly
correlated with itself and the Pearson Product moment correlation displays symmetry.
This immediately implies that |CORRX(i, j)| = 1− r2ij.
Now I will show that the area of the parallelogram formed by the row vectors of
CORRX(i, j) is equal to 1 − r2ij. Such a parallelogram can be depicted as in Figure
4. The diagonal
−−→
P2P4 cuts the parallelogram in half such that half of the area of the
parallelogram lies above
−−→
P2P4 (or 4A) while half of the area lies below
−−→
P2P4 (or 4B).
This implies the following, where D represents the distance . . .
75P1P2P3P4 represents the area of parallelogram P1P2P3P4.
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P1P2P3P4 = 4A+4B = 2(4A)
= 2 ∗ 1
2
∗D(P2, P4) ∗D(P5, P3)
= 2 ∗ 1
2
∗D(P2, P4) ∗
1
2
D(P1, P3)
=
1
2
∗D(P2, P4) ∗D(P1, P3)
=
1
2
√
(1 + rji)2 + (1 + rij)2
√
(1− rji)2 + (1− rij)2
=
1
2
√
(1 + rij)2 + (1 + rij)2
√
(1− rij)2 + (1− rij)2
=
1
2
√
2(1 + rij)2
√
2(1− rij)2
=
1
2
√
2(1 + rij)
√
2(1− rij)
= (1 + rij)(1− rij)
= 1− r2ij
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Appendix D: Industrial Classification Results Summary
Below are two tables summarizing the results from applying the measures to the sample
of firms described earlier. The first table summarizes the mean results using an equal
weighting scheme (i.e. 1
2
weight assigned to earnings and cash flows in C1 and C2) while
the second table summarizes the mean results using the alternative weighting scheme
described in Appendix B.
Table D.1: Industry Closeness with Equal Weighting Scheme
Measure SIC GIC Random
U
n
tr
im
m
e
d C1A 0.0918 (37/66) 0.0943 (46/68) 0.0394 (10/10)
C2A 0.8684 (58/66) 0.8724 (63/68) 0.8876 (10/10)
C1 0.1629 (53/66) 0.1570 (57/68) 0.0913 (10/10)
C2 0.7912 (64/66) 0.8061 (66/68) 0.8287 (10/10)
T
ri
m
m
e
d C
1
A 0.1520 (29/56) 0.1455 (42/63) 0.0507 (10/10)
C2A 0.8479 (42/56) 0.8570 (41/63) 0.8867 (10/10)
C1 0.3543 (47/56) 0.2973 (52/63) 0.1529 (10/10)
C2 0.6615 (52/56) 0.6751 (61/63) 0.7737 (10/10)
For example, applying closeness measure one with abnormal earnings and cash flows
to the untrimmed sample and calculating the mean SIC industry closeness over the
time period 1999-2010 gives 0.0918. The fraction after each reported measure is the
proportion of industries (or groups in the case of the random samples) whose closeness
was statistically significantly different than 0 (1 for closeness measure two) at the 10%
level or better. Thus, for example, 37 out of the 66 SIC industries represented in the
sample had C1A statistically significantly different from 0 at the 10% level or greater
76.
From Table 3.4 one sees that the SIC and GIC scheme perform very similarly in regards
to the two measures. That is, the difference between the measures applied to the SIC
and GIC scheme is practically zero. The only exception to this is in the trimmed sample
where C1 is 0.3543 for the SIC but equal to 0.2973 for the GIC scheme.
76i.e. The p–value from a hypothesis test of whether C1A is different than zero was ≤ 0.1 for 37 out of
the 66 SIC industries represented in the sample.
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Table D.2 on the following page summarizes the results using the alternative weighting
scheme described in Appendix B where the weight placed on the earnings and cash flow
variables is proportional to their relative variances over the sample period by industry77.
Note that the results are very similar to the results when equal weights were given to
earnings and cash flow variables. It is interesting to note that the industry variance of
earnings was less than the industry variance of cash flows for every industry (regardless
of the classification scheme used) over the sample period78.
Table D.2: Industry Closeness with Alternative Weighting Scheme
Measure SIC GIC Random
U
n
tr
im
m
e
d C1A 0.0983 (40/66) 0.1005 (45/68) 0.0405 (10/10)
C2A 0.8654 (57/66) 0.8699 (63/68) 0.8872 (10/10)
C1 0.1615 (52/66) 0.1576 (57/68) 0.0919 (10/10)
C2 0.7921 (64/66) 0.8071 (66/68) 0.8307 (10/10)
T
ri
m
m
e
d C
1
A 0.1635 (30/56) 0.1520 (40/63) 0.0529 (10/10)
C2A 0.8422 (45/56) 0.8529 (42/63) 0.8860 (10/10)
C1 0.3555 (47/56) 0.2955 (51/63) 0.1479 (10/10)
C2 0.6624 (49/56) 0.6793 (61/63) 0.7693 (10/10)
The following eight figures are histograms of untrimmed industrial classification close-
ness for both the SIC & GIC scheme using both unexpected fundamentals and realized
fundamentals79. Normal curves are superimposed over the histograms to give the reader
an idea of the shape of the closeness distribution in relation to an equal–mean normal
distribution.
77The mean weight given to earnings and cash flows respectively was around (0.61, 0.39).
78Also, the industry variance of earnings was, on average, 33% less than the industry variance of cash
flows.
79The histograms appear similar for the trimmed sample but the means are a little higher (shifted to
the right) for C1 and a little lower (shifted to the left) for C2 consistent with the results presented in
the paper.
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Figure D.1: Histogram of C1A for SIC scheme
Figure D.2: Histogram of C2A for SIC scheme
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Figure D.3: Histogram of C1 for SIC scheme
Figure D.4: Histogram of C2 for SIC scheme
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Figure D.5: Histogram of C1A for GIC scheme
Figure D.6: Histogram of C2A for GIC scheme
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Figure D.7: Histogram of C1 for GIC scheme
Figure D.8: Histogram of C2 for GIC scheme
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Appendix E: Portfolio Sample Selection Summary
Table E.1 summarizes the sample selection procedure and summary statistics for each
SIC industry–portfolio tested.
Table E.1: Portfolio Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
SIC Industry 10 39 15 20 28
N beg.(a) 98 26 17 90 328
C1 beg.(b) 0.0203 0.0190 0.3925 0.1869 0.024
C2 beg.(c) 0.8094 0.8267 0.6103 0.7876 0.8285
non 12/31 FY end(d) 22 10 6 39 71
earnings announced (0,+3)(e) 2 3 1 2 12
Missing CRSP data (f) 35 3 3 20 74
Leader(g) 1 1 1 1 1
Leader announcement date(h) 1/20/11 2/2/11 1/27/11 2/2/11 1/20/11
N final(i) 38 9 6 28 170
C1 final(j) 0.0321 0.0165 0.5437 0.24 0.0144
C2 final(k) 0.7592 0.8536 0.5721 0.7424 0.8186
mean pair–wise corr.(l) 0.1354 0.2422 0.5867 0.1486 0.07
EPS(m) $4.64 $1.86 $33.42 $2.55 $5.18
Expected EPS(n) $4.26 $1.84 $33.03 $2.55 $5.04
News(o) $0.38 $0.02 $0.39 $0 $0.14
Median Beta(p) 0.7598 0.4252 2.118 0.557 0.5327
Avg. Total Assets(q) $11.55 $0.21 $2.84 $11.62 $5.78
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Table E.1: Continued
SIC Industry 29 80 44 45 63
N beg.(a) 31 50 23 23 114
C1 beg.(b) 0.4885 0.284 0.2743 0.2728 0.2444
C2 beg.(c) 0.6236 0.722 0.7678 0.7990 0.7825
non 12/31 FY end(d) 3 6 3 5 1
earnings announced (0,+3)(e) 14 0 2 3 9
Missing CRSP data (f) 2 0 7 5 22
Leader(g) 1 1 1 1 1
Leader announcement date(h) 1/31/11 1/25/11 1/27/2011 1/18/11 1/25/11
N final(i) 11 43 10 9 81
C1 final(j) 0.5185 0.2922 0.347 0.2309 0.2813
C2 final(k) 0.5817 0.7043 0.7244 0.7846 0.7656
mean pair–wise corr.(l) 0.6969 0.4400 0.5162 0.2581 0.405
EPS(m) $6.22 $4.05 $2.13 1.71 $6.26
Expected EPS(n) $5.95 $3.98 $2.07 1.79 $6.08
News(o) $0.27 $0.07 $0.06 $(0.08) $0.18
Median Beta(p) 0.8907 0.3072 0.5895 0.8515 0.8864
Avg. Total Assets(q) $104.69 $3.14 $2.17 $10.89 $85.32
Legend for Tables 3.1 & E.1
(a)Beginning sample size.
(b),(c)Closeness of beginning sample over the historical time period 1999–2009.
(d)Number of firms with non 12/31 fiscal–year ends.
(e)Number of firms with earnings announced within 3 trading days of leader.
(f)Number of firms with missing CRSP returns for at least one of the six days in the window
(-2,+3) around leaders earnings announcement (t = 0).
(g)The firm which announces 4th quarter earnings for 2010 first.
(h)Date in which leader announced 4th quarter earnings for 2010.
(i)Final sample size.
(j),(k)Closeness of final sample over the historical time period 1999–2009.
(l)Mean pair–wise Pearson correlation in earnings between leader and other portfolio firms
over time period 1999–2009.
(m)Industry “leader” actual 2010 Earnings per share.
(n)Industry “leader” expected earnings per share for 2010 using IBES data.
(o)Difference between expected earnings per share and actual earnings per share.
(p)Median beta of the portfolio firms where beta is measured as described in the paper.
(q)Average 2010 total assets (in $billions) for portfolio firms.
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Appendix F: Portfolio Return Results Summary
Table F.1 on the following page summarizes the results of applying the trading strategy
described in Chapter 3 to ten of the two–digit SIC industry portfolios from Table 2.4.
Average unexpected returns (AR) as well as actual returns (R) are given along with the
market return (MR) over each window (W)80 for each SIC industry–portfolio (SICP).
Additionally, OP represents the price paid for one share of each security in the portfolio.
This is obtained by summing the opening prices of the securities at the starting day of
the window. Finally, CP represents the price that would have been received by selling
one share of each security in the portfolio at the close of the last trading day in the
window.
The portfolio abnormal return (PAR) is also given for each of the ten industry–portfolios
tested. This is calculated by first assigning weights to each security in proportion to how
far security i’s beta is from one. I assume a risk neutral investor and thus the weight
assigned to security i (i.e. share of investment given to security i) is decreasing in the
quantity (1 − βi). The weight thus is given as the following where N is the number of
securities in the portfolio.
wi =
1
N
+
 1N −
 |1− βi|N∑
i=1
|1− βi|

 (4)
The intuition for the above equation is the following. From a risk neutral investors’
standpoint it seems intuitive that they want to invest in securities with betas equal to
one. Investment in securities with betas different than one should be decreasing in the
magnitude of the difference. The above equation assures that this holds and also insures
that the sum of the weights is equal to one. Intuitively, the above equation assigns
80Actual returns are only given over the windows that would be feasible to implement the trading
strategy.
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weight wi to security i in proportion to how much |1− βi| contributes to the sum of all
of the security beta deviations from one. Securities with betas deviating very little from
one contribute less to the total deviation and thus are assigned greater weight.
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Table F.1: SIC Industry–Portfolio Return Results
SICP W OP CP CP−OP R MR AR PAR
[0,+1] $869.54 $855.98 $(13.56) −1.56% −0.26% −3.72% −4.56%
10 [0,+2] $869.54 $855.97 $(13.57) −1.56% 0.37% −5.29% −6.34%
[0,+3] $869.54 $847.02 $(22.52) −2.59% 0.33% −6.40% −7.82%
[0,+1] $107.64 $103.52 $(4.12) −3.83% −1.51% −1.04% −1.06%
15 [0,+2] $107.64 $103.53 $(4.11) −3.82% −0.76% −3.07% −2.92%
[0,+3] $107.64 $105.84 $(1.80) −1.67% 0.93% −4.25% −3.88%
[0,+1] $896.05 $893.69 $(2.36) −0.26% 0.07% −0.07% −0.32%
20 [0,+2] $896.05 $896.53 $(0.48) 0.05% 0.29% 0.20% 0.10%
[0,+3] $896.05 $897.53 $1.48 0.17% 0.90% 0.31% 0.09%
[0,+1] $4075.80 $4031.70 $(44.10) −1.08% −0.26% −1.64% −1.71%
28 [0,+2] $4075.80 $4066.00 $(9.80) −0.24% 0.37% −1.12% −1.30%
[0,+3] $4075.80 $4075.80 $0.00 0.00% 0.33% −1.24% −1.28%
[0,+1] $488.23 $509.15 $20.92 4.28% 0.95% 2.84% 4.26%
29 [0,+2] $488.23 $507.32 $19.09 3.91% −0.79% 3.02% 3.98%
[0,+3] $488.23 $507.44 $19.21 3.93% −0.03% 3.21% 3.66%
[0,+1] $78.28 $78.17 $(0.11) −0.14% 0.07% −0.77% −0.55%
39 [0,+2] $78.28 $78.17 $(0.11) −0.14% 0.29% −0.73% −0.96%
[0,+3] $78.28 $78.97 $0.69 0.88% 0.90% −0.26% −0.16%
[0,+1] $327.70 $335.70 $8.00 2.44% −1.51% 2.20% 2.67%
44 [0,+2] $327.70 $332.78 $5.07 1.55% −0.76% 0.90% 0.58%
[0,+3] $327.70 $336.85 $9.15 2.79% 0.01% 0.43% −0.42%
[0,+1] $268.30 $258.23 $(10.07) −3.75% −1.01% −4.24% −4.57%
45 [0,+2] $268.30 $252.22 $(16.08) −5.99% −1.39% −5.39% −5.16%
[0,+3] $268.30 $247.82 $(20.48) −7.63% −1.26% −6.93% −6.92%
[0,+1] $3573.60 $3638.90 $65.30 1.83% 0.69% 0.85% 1.22%
63 [0,+2] $3573.60 $3653.10 $79.50 2.22% 0.90% 1.13% 1.46%
[0,+3] $3573.60 $3582.00 $8.40 0.24% −0.83% 0.33% 0.52%
[0,+1] $958.09 $972.10 $14.01 1.46% 0.69% 1.54% 1.56%
80 [0,+2] $958.09 $991.55 $33.46 3.49% 0.90% 2.03% 2.01%
[0,+3] $958.09 $984.37 $26.28 2.74% −0.83% 0.69% 0.72%
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